Bug 2502365 (CVE-2026-63939) - CVE-2026-63939 kernel: KVM: SEV: Compute the correct max length of the in-GHCB scratch area
Summary: CVE-2026-63939 kernel: KVM: SEV: Compute the correct max length of the in-GHC...
Keywords:
Status: NEW
Alias: CVE-2026-63939
Product: Security Response
Classification: Other
Component: vulnerability
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: Linux
high
high
Target Milestone: ---
Assignee: Product Security
QA Contact:
URL:
Whiteboard:
Depends On:
Blocks:
TreeView+ depends on / blocked
 
Reported: 2026-07-19 16:04 UTC by OSIDB Bzimport
Modified: 2026-07-21 21:55 UTC (History)
2 users (show)

Fixed In Version:
Clone Of:
Environment:
Last Closed:
Embargoed:


Attachments (Terms of Use)

Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-07-19 16:04:10 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

KVM: SEV: Compute the correct max length of the in-GHCB scratch area

When setting the length of the GHCB scratch area, and the area is in the
GHCB shared buffer, set the effective length of the scratch area to the max
possible size given the start of the guest-provided pointer, and the end of
the shared buffer.

The code was "fine" when first introduced, as KVM doesn't consult the
length of the buffer when emulating MMIO, because the passed in @len always
specifies the *max* size required.  But for PSC requests, the incoming @len
is just the minimum length (to process the header), and KVM needs to know
the full size of the scratch area to avoid buffer overflows (spoiler alert).

Opportunistically rename @len => @min_len to better reflect its role.


Note You need to log in before you can comment on or make changes to this bug.