In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

tcp: initialize standalone TCP-AO response padding

tcp_v4_send_ack() and tcp_v6_send_response() construct standalone TCP
responses with TCP-AO options.  The option length carries the actual MAC
length, but the TCP header length includes the option rounded up to a
four-byte boundary.

tcp_ao_hash_hdr() writes the MAC only.  Thus, when the MAC length is not
four-byte aligned, the one to three bytes after the MAC are left
uninitialized and may be transmitted.  For the normal TCP-AO hashing
mode, those bytes also have to be initialized before computing the MAC.

Initialize only the alignment padding in the TCP-AO branches, before
hashing the header.  Use TCPOPT_NOP, as in the normal TCP-AO output path.
This avoids adding work to non-AO TCP responses while preserving a valid
authenticated header.