In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

xdp: reject clones that overrun skb_shared_info tailroom

xdpf_clone() clones broadcast copies into a single page and sets
frame_sz to PAGE_SIZE. __xdp_build_skb_from_frame() later treats that
page like a normal XDP frame and expects the usual skb_shared_info
tailroom at the end of the buffer.

The current check only rejects frames whose linear xdp_frame header,
headroom, and packet data exceed PAGE_SIZE. A source frame backed by a
larger allocation can still satisfy that check while extending into the
clone's required shared-info area. When such a clone is converted back
into an skb, build_skb_around() places skb_shared_info over live packet
bytes and later writes can corrupt XDP return metadata.

Reject clones unless their linear area fits inside
SKB_WITH_OVERHEAD(PAGE_SIZE), matching the tailroom requirement already
enforced by the XDP-to-skb conversion path.