In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

fuse: copy request headers via a stack buffer for io-uring

The fuse-io-uring transport copies req->in.h out to the ring in
fuse_uring_copy_to_ring() and req->out.h back in fuse_uring_commit().
Both headers live inside the fuse_request slab object, whose cache
(fuse_req_cachep) is created without a usercopy whitelist, so copying
them directly to/from userspace trips CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY and
panics:

  usercopy: Kernel memory exposure attempt detected from SLUB object
  'fuse_request' (offset 56, size 40)!
  kernel BUG at mm/usercopy.c:102!
  Oops: invalid opcode: 0000 [#1] SMP KASAN NOPTI
  RIP: 0010:usercopy_abort (mm/usercopy.c:90)
  Call Trace:
   __check_heap_object (mm/slub.c:8268)
   __check_object_size (mm/usercopy.c:197 mm/usercopy.c:258 mm/usercopy.c:223)
   copy_header_to_ring (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:618)
   fuse_uring_prepare_send (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:776 fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:785)
   fuse_uring_send_in_task (fs/fuse/dev_uring.c:1306)
   tctx_task_work_run (io_uring/tw.c:96)
   task_work_run (kernel/task_work.c:233)
   io_run_task_work (io_uring/tw.h:84)
   io_cqring_wait (io_uring/wait.c:278)
   __do_sys_io_uring_enter (io_uring/io_uring.c:2685)
   entry_SYSCALL_64_after_hwframe (arch/x86/entry/entry_64.S:121)

Bounce both headers through an on-stack copy so the usercopy touches
stack memory, not the slab object.