In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

SUNRPC: Reject short RFC 4121 MIC tokens in gss_krb5_verify_mic_v2

gss_krb5_verify_mic_v2() reads the token ID at ptr[0..1], the flags
byte at ptr[2], and padding at ptr[3..7], then passes
ptr + GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN and cksum_len to gss_krb5_mic_build_sg().
None of these accesses check read_token->len first.

The minimum safe token size is GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN (16) plus
ctx->krb5e->cksum_len (12-24, depending on the enctype).  All callers
accept shorter tokens from the wire:

 - gss_unwrap_resp_integ() enforces only an upper bound
   (offset + len <= rcv_buf->len) before allocating
   mic.data = kmalloc(len) and passing it to gss_verify_mic().
   A malicious NFS server can therefore supply a short checksum
   opaque, producing a small slab allocation that the Kerberos MIC
   verifier reads past.

 - gss_validate() enforces only len <= RPC_MAX_AUTH_SIZE (400)
   before passing the wire-supplied length to
   gss_validate_seqno_mic(), which constructs a mic xdr_netobj
   and calls gss_verify_mic().

 - svcauth_gss_verify_header() enforces only
   checksum.len >= XDR_UNIT (4 bytes) before dispatching to
   gss_verify_mic().

 - svcauth_gss_unwrap_integ() checks only that the checksum fits
   in gsd->gsd_scratch.

Add a length guard at the top of gss_krb5_verify_mic_v2(), before any
ptr[] access or scatterlist construction.  Well-formed MIC tokens from
gss_krb5_get_mic_v2() already have exactly GSS_KRB5_TOK_HDR_LEN +
cksum_len bytes, so valid traffic is unaffected.