In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

HID: intel-thc-hid: intel-quickspi: validate report size before copy

write_cmd_to_txdma() builds an output report in qsdev->report_buf, a heap
buffer allocated in quickspi_alloc_report_buf() to the device-descriptor
derived max_report_len (a few hundred bytes for a touch controller).  It
copies the caller-supplied report into that buffer:

    memcpy(write_buf->content, report_buf, report_buf_len);

The HID core caps a report at HID_MAX_BUFFER_SIZE (16384) by default, and
quickspi_hid_ll_driver does not set max_buffer_size, so the length reaches
the driver unbounded.  A hidraw SET_REPORT/SET_FEATURE ioctl carrying a
report larger than max_report_len therefore overflows report_buf with
attacker-controlled length and content.

Record the report_buf allocation size and reject reports that do not fit
before copying, matching the equivalent guard in the intel-quicki2c
sibling (quicki2c_init_write_buf()) and the hid-goodix-spi fix.

write_cmd_to_txdma() writes the output report header ahead of the content
in the same buffer, so size the allocation to cover the header as well.
That keeps the added bound from rejecting a maximum-sized report.