In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nfsd: block non-SAVEFH ops after FOREIGN PUTFH to prevent NULL deref

When CONFIG_NFSD_V4_2_INTER_SSC is enabled, nfsd4_putfh() can return
success with fh_dentry and fh_export both NULL if fh_verify() returns
nfserr_stale and putfh->no_verify is true. The NFSD4_FH_FOREIGN flag
is set, but the compound dispatch loop only uses this flag to bypass
the nfserr_nofilehandle check -- it does not prevent subsequent ops
from running with a NULL fh_dentry.

A remote client can exploit this by crafting a COMPOUND that includes
an inter-SSC COPY (which causes check_if_stalefh_allowed() to set
no_verify=true on the saved PUTFH) with an additional op inserted
between the source PUTFH and SAVEFH. For example, SETATTR calls
fh_want_write() which dereferences fh_export->ex_path.mnt without
calling fh_verify() first, causing a NULL pointer dereference in the
nfsd kthread.

Fix this by gating the dispatch loop: when NFSD4_FH_FOREIGN is set
and fh_dentry is NULL, only OP_SAVEFH (needed for the inter-SSC flow)
and ops with ALLOWED_WITHOUT_FH (which don't need a resolved
filehandle) may proceed. All other ops receive nfserr_stale, per
RFC 7862 Section 15.2.3 which specifies that foreign filehandle
validation is deferred to the consuming operation and NFS4ERR_STALE
returned at that point.