In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

scsi: target: iscsi: Reserve a terminator byte for the login payload

iscsi_target_check_login_request() rejects a login PDU whose
DataSegmentLength exceeds MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS, but the test is '>' and
login->req_buf is allocated with exactly MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS
bytes. Since iscsit_get_login_rx() receives payload_length + padding
bytes, where

	padding = ((-payload_length) & 3);

any payload_length from 8189 to 8192 fills the whole 8192 byte
buffer. The write stays in bounds, but no byte is left for a NUL
terminator.

The buffer is subsequently consumed as a C string. In the CHAP path
chap_check_algorithm() calls kstrdup(a_str), and extract_param() calls
strstr(in_buf, pattern) followed by strlen_semi(), none of which take a
length. convert_null_to_semi() additionally rewrites every embedded NUL
to ';', so even a payload made of well formed NUL separated key=value
records is left without a terminator. These walk past the end of the
object into adjacent slab memory. It is reachable by an unauthenticated
initiator against a portal configured for CHAP; when authentication is
not required iscsi_login_zero_tsih_s2() rewrites AuthMethod to None and
the CHAP path is never entered.

Allocate one extra byte. kzalloc() zeroes it and nothing ever writes to
it, as every writer copies to offset 0 for at most MAX_KEY_VALUE_PAIRS
bytes, so the buffer is always terminated.