In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

wifi: mwifiex: bound the pairwise-cipher OUI walk to the IE length

mwifiex_search_oui_in_ie() reads a pairwise-cipher (PTK) count from a
beacon/probe-response RSN or WPA information element and then walks that
many 4-byte OUIs, comparing each with memcmp(). The count comes straight
from the (attacker-supplied) IE and is never checked against the
element's own length, and the callers admit the element on element_id
alone (has_ieee_hdr() / has_vendor_hdr(), no length check). A crafted
RSN/WPA IE with a large pairwise count therefore makes the walk read up
to 255 * 4 bytes past the element -- an out-of-bounds read of the
kmemdup()'d beacon buffer, reachable from any AP whose beacon/probe
response is processed during scan-result parsing.

Pass the number of IE bytes available at the OUI list and bound the walk
to the element. Keep the length signed and reject a negative value
before any unsigned arithmetic, so a small or zero IE length cannot
underflow to a large size_t and defeat the bound.

Found by 0sec automated security-research tooling (https://0sec.ai).