Bug 2577729 (CVE-2026-99734) - CVE-2026-99734 kernel: kernel: Denial of service via improper inode validation in shared memory subsystem
Summary: CVE-2026-99734 kernel: kernel: Denial of service via improper inode validatio...
Keywords:
Status: NEW
Alias: CVE-2026-99734
Product: Security Response
Classification: Other
Component: vulnerability
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: Linux
medium
medium
Target Milestone: ---
Assignee: Product Security DevOps Team
QA Contact:
URL:
Whiteboard:
Depends On:
Blocks:
TreeView+ depends on / blocked
 
Reported: 2026-11-20 06:10 UTC by OSIDB Bzimport
Modified: 2026-11-20 10:41 UTC (History)
17 users (show)

Fixed In Version:
Clone Of:
Environment:
Last Closed:
Embargoed:


Attachments (Terms of Use)

Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-11-20 06:10:38 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/shmem: make shmem_file() check the file's inode

shmem_file() only checks if file->f_mapping is a shmem mapping. This
mapping can belong to another file, however, as with a Coda file backed
by a tmpfs container after mmap().

So it does not guarantee that the file inode is an actual shmem inode.

Seal handling and memfd preservation use this check before accessing
shmem inode state, so they can access an inode of the wrong type.

Let's make shmem_file() check the inode's file operations instead, to
identify shmem inodes reliably. This will identify regular shmem inodes,
including memfds and ordinary tmpfs files, independently of wrapper file
operations.

Use shmem_mapping() in collapse_file() instead to not change the behavior
of collapse_file(): it operates on the page cache and uses mapping->host
for shmem inode operations. Focusing on the file does not seem relevant.


Note You need to log in before you can comment on or make changes to this bug.