An attacker who has control on a container using a Volume can traverse arbitrary files on the host filesystem (which essentially is an escape) when an administrator tries to export this Volume, by exploiting a TOCTTOU vulnerability to replace a normal file in the Volume as a symlink. The container-based platform can use Podman as the container engine and provide interfaces that encapsulate common commands (e.g., run, cp, volume create, etc.) for its users to manage the container. We assume that the adversary in the container-based platform can control multiple containers and attempt to escape from the containers, and can also request the platforms via legitimate interfaces to create volumes, start-up containers connected to the volume, migrate (or extract) the volume (by the 'volume export' and 'volume import'), and so on. When the platform performs 'volume export', the adversary can exploit this vulnerability to steal the sensitive file on the host and get it from the exported tarball or the migrated volume.
Created podman tracking bugs for this issue: Affects: fedora-all [bug 2170631]
This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Via RHSA-2023:2758 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2023:2758
This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 Via RHSA-2023:2802 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2023:2802
This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat OpenShift Container Platform 4.13 Via RHSA-2023:1325 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2023:1325
This bug is now closed. Further updates for individual products will be reflected on the CVE page(s): https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2023-0778