An out-of-bounds read in dns_validate_dns_response in dns.c was discovered in HAProxy through 1.8.14. Due to a missing check when validating DNS responses, remote attackers might be able read the 16 bytes corresponding to an AAAA record from the non-initialized part of the buffer, possibly accessing anything that was left on the stack, or even past the end of the 8193-byte buffer, depending on the value of accepted_payload_size. Upstream Patch: http://git.haproxy.org/?p=haproxy.git;a=commit;h=efbbdf72
Created haproxy tracking bugs for this issue: Affects: fedora-all [bug 1658882]
External Reference: https://www.mail-archive.com/haproxy@formilux.org/msg32055.html
Statement: This issue did not affect the versions of haproxy as shipped with Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 and 7.
This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat Software Collections for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Red Hat Software Collections for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.4 EUS Red Hat Software Collections for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.5 EUS Red Hat Software Collections for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.6 EUS Via RHSA-2019:1436 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2019:1436
This bug is now closed. Further updates for individual products will be reflected on the CVE page(s): https://access.redhat.com/security/cve/cve-2018-20102