Bug 1693357

Summary:	fprintd: stores user fingerprints as image files without encryption [fedora-all]
Product:	[Fedora] Fedora	Reporter:	Laura Pardo <lpardo>
Component:	fprintd	Assignee:	Bastien Nocera <bnocera>
Status:	CLOSED UPSTREAM	QA Contact:	Fedora Extras Quality Assurance <extras-qa>
Severity:	low	Docs Contact:
Priority:	low
Version:	29	CC:	bnocera, sungjungk
Target Milestone:	---	Keywords:	Security, SecurityTracking
Target Release:	---
Hardware:	Unspecified
OS:	Unspecified
Whiteboard:
Fixed In Version:		Doc Type:	No Doc Update
Doc Text:		Story Points:	---
Clone Of:		Environment:
Last Closed:	2019-07-26 13:16:33 UTC	Type:	---
Regression:	---	Mount Type:	---
Documentation:	---	CRM:
Verified Versions:		Category:	---
oVirt Team:	---	RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team:	---	Target Upstream Version:
Embargoed:
Bug Depends On:
Bug Blocks:	1693356

Description Laura Pardo 2019-03-27 16:02:45 UTC

This is an automatically created tracking bug!  It was created to ensure
that one or more security vulnerabilities are fixed in affected versions
of fedora-all.

For comments that are specific to the vulnerability please use bugs filed
against the "Security Response" product referenced in the "Blocks" field.

For more information see:
http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Security/TrackingBugs

When submitting as an update, use the fedpkg template provided in the next
comment(s).  This will include the bug IDs of this tracking bug as well as
the relevant top-level CVE bugs.

Please also mention the CVE IDs being fixed in the RPM changelog and the
fedpkg commit message.

NOTE: this issue affects multiple supported versions of Fedora. While only
one tracking bug has been filed, please correct all affected versions at
the same time.  If you need to fix the versions independent of each other,
you may clone this bug as appropriate.

Comment 1 Laura Pardo 2019-03-27 16:02:47 UTC

Use the following template to for the 'fedpkg update' request to submit an
update for this issue as it contains the top-level parent bug(s) as well as
this tracking bug.  This will ensure that all associated bugs get updated
when new packages are pushed to stable.

=====

# bugfix, security, enhancement, newpackage (required)
type=security

# low, medium, high, urgent (required)
severity=low

# testing, stable
request=testing

# Bug numbers: 1234,9876
bugs=1693356,1693357

# Description of your update
notes=Security fix for [PUT CVEs HERE]

# Enable request automation based on the stable/unstable karma thresholds
autokarma=True
stable_karma=3
unstable_karma=-3

# Automatically close bugs when this marked as stable
close_bugs=True

# Suggest that users restart after update
suggest_reboot=False

======

Additionally, you may opt to use the bodhi web interface to submit updates:

https://bodhi.fedoraproject.org/updates/new

Comment 2 Bastien Nocera 2019-04-03 10:20:45 UTC

There are no short-term plans to fixing this. Any attempts at encrypting the fingerprints would just be security through obscurity as the decryption would need to be made available to fprintd and would therefore be available to other processes.

The only way to currently safeguard the fingerprints is to run with SELinux enabled, and made sure that only the fprintd binary has access to those saved fingerprints.

Comment 3 Seong-Joong Kim 2019-04-12 09:36:17 UTC

As mentioned before, I don’t think it would be as good.

Particularly, desktop users usually disable or change SELinux setting from enforce to permissive mode.

I think that it is not justifiable to shift protection responsibility to OS entirely.

Instead, we need to devise a data encryption/protection scheme at least.

What do you think of it?

Comment 4 Bastien Nocera 2019-07-26 13:16:33 UTC

The issue was already reported upstream:
https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/libfprint/fprintd/issues/16

I don't think that there's a security impact to Fedora, but the image files could be further protected. When that happens, it will happen as an upstream initiative, so closing this bug.