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There are no short-term plans to fixing this. Any attempts at encrypting the fingerprints would just be security through obscurity as the decryption would need to be made available to fprintd and would therefore be available to other processes.
The only way to currently safeguard the fingerprints is to run with SELinux enabled, and made sure that only the fprintd binary has access to those saved fingerprints.
As mentioned before, I don’t think it would be as good.
Particularly, desktop users usually disable or change SELinux setting from enforce to permissive mode.
I think that it is not justifiable to shift protection responsibility to OS entirely.
Instead, we need to devise a data encryption/protection scheme at least.
What do you think of it?
The issue was already reported upstream:
I don't think that there's a security impact to Fedora, but the image files could be further protected. When that happens, it will happen as an upstream initiative, so closing this bug.