Bug 2483482 (CVE-2026-46384)

Summary: CVE-2026-46384 github.com/hamba/avro/v2: github.com/linkedin/goavro/v2: Integer Overflow in Avro Decoder
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: high Docs Contact:
Priority: high    
Version: unspecifiedCC: aazores, alcohan, amctagga, aoconnor, bniver, cmah, eaguilar, ebaron, flucifre, gmeno, gparvin, groman, jbalunas, jolong, lchilton, mbenjamin, mhackett, pahickey, pjindal, rhaigner, rhel-process-autobot, sfeifer, sostapov, vereddy, watson-tool-maintainers
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
Target Release: ---   
Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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An integer overflow flaw was found in Go Avro in decoding logic. Multiple decoder paths performs unsafe integer conversions and overflow-prone arithmetic operations on attacker-controlled values from Avro payloads. A remote attacker during Avro decoder operations could exploit this issue using specially crafted Avro data to consume excessive resources by bypassing memory limits and triggering crashes leading to a denial of service in affected applications.
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
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Bug Depends On: 2488849, 2488850, 2488851, 2488852, 2488853, 2488854    
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-05-29 21:02:27 UTC 
iskorotkov/avro is a fast Go Avro codec. Prior to 2.33.0, several Avro decoder paths read attacker-controlled 64-bit values from the wire format and either narrowed them to platform-sized int before bounds-checking, or summed them with overflow-prone signed-int arithmetic. On 32-bit targets (GOARCH=386, arm, mips, wasm, etc.), the truncation paths can silently bypass byte-slice limits, select the wrong union branch, or hit the OCF negative-make panic via wrap. Three sub-issues are not 32-bit-specific: cumulative-size arithmetic overflow in arrayDecoder.Decode / mapDecoder.Decode / mapDecoderUnmarshaler.Decode (wraps at math.MaxInt64 on amd64 / arm64 and bypasses MaxSliceAllocSize / MaxMapAllocSize), math.MinInt negation in block-header handling, and make([]byte, size) with a negative size in OCF block reads — all three panic or bypass caps on any platform, giving an attacker a denial-of-service primitive there. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.33.0.