Bug 2483482 (CVE-2026-46384) - CVE-2026-46384 github.com/hamba/avro/v2: github.com/linkedin/goavro/v2: Integer Overflow in Avro Decoder
Summary: CVE-2026-46384 github.com/hamba/avro/v2: github.com/linkedin/goavro/v2: Integ...
Keywords:
Status: NEW
Alias: CVE-2026-46384
Product: Security Response
Classification: Other
Component: vulnerability
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: Linux
high
high
Target Milestone: ---
Assignee: Product Security DevOps Team
QA Contact:
URL:
Whiteboard:
Depends On: 2488849 2488850 2488851 2488852 2488853 2488854
Blocks:
TreeView+ depends on / blocked
 
Reported: 2026-05-29 21:02 UTC by OSIDB Bzimport
Modified: 2026-06-15 10:42 UTC (History)
25 users (show)

Fixed In Version:
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-05-29 21:02:27 UTC
iskorotkov/avro is a fast Go Avro codec. Prior to 2.33.0, several Avro decoder paths read attacker-controlled 64-bit values from the wire format and either narrowed them to platform-sized int before bounds-checking, or summed them with overflow-prone signed-int arithmetic. On 32-bit targets (GOARCH=386, arm, mips, wasm, etc.), the truncation paths can silently bypass byte-slice limits, select the wrong union branch, or hit the OCF negative-make panic via wrap. Three sub-issues are not 32-bit-specific: cumulative-size arithmetic overflow in arrayDecoder.Decode / mapDecoder.Decode / mapDecoderUnmarshaler.Decode (wraps at math.MaxInt64 on amd64 / arm64 and bypasses MaxSliceAllocSize / MaxMapAllocSize), math.MinInt negation in block-header handling, and make([]byte, size) with a negative size in OCF block reads — all three panic or bypass caps on any platform, giving an attacker a denial-of-service primitive there. This vulnerability is fixed in 2.33.0.


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