Bug 2571543

Summary: dhcp: source signature does not verify with openpgpverify (SHA-1 data signature)
Product: [Fedora] Fedora Reporter: Jakub Jelen <jjelen>
Component: dhcpAssignee: Martin Osvald 🛹 <mosvald>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact: Fedora Extras Quality Assurance <extras-qa>
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Version: rawhideCC: fhrdina, jorton, mosvald, pavel, pemensik
Target Milestone: ---Flags: mosvald: needinfo? (jjelen)
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Bug Blocks: 2569052    

Description Jakub Jelen 2026-11-11 08:38:28 UTC
As part of the Fedora 45 Change Sequoia openpgpverify (https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/Sequoia_openpgpverify), %gpgverify (GnuPG) is being replaced by %openpgpverify (Sequoia sqv). For dhcp, the switch can't be done in a simple PR: %gpgverify accepts the current upstream signature, but %openpgpverify rejects it.

Failing check (dist-git commit ba61518c3ee6):

    %openpgpverify --keyring=codesign2021.txt --signature=dhcp-4.4.3-P1.tar.gz.asc --data=dhcp-4.4.3-P1.tar.gz

    Verifying signature:
               Policy rejected non-revocation signature (Binary) requiring collision resistance
      because: SHA1 is not considered secure
    0 of 1 signatures are valid (threshold is: 1).
    openpgpverify: Signature verification failed.

Why:

The release signature (SHA-1, made 2022-09-28) is by the subkey AADBBA5074F1402F7B69D56BC5B4EE931A9F9DFD (RSA 4096 bits) of the key 7E1C91AC8030A5A59D1EFAB9750F3C87723E4012 (RSA 4096 bits). sqv reports only the first problem it hits (above). All the problems found:

- The release signature itself uses SHA-1. SHA-1 is no longer considered secure: collisions have been practical since 2017 (SHAttered) and chosen-prefix collisions since 2020 (SHA-1 is a Shambles), and the crypto policy rejects it; for signatures over data, this won't be relaxed.

The key itself is fine.

What can be done:

- Ask upstream to sign releases with SHA-256 or better, ideally with a current key.
- Until then the package can keep %gpgverify, or verify the tarball differently (for example against a checksum published over HTTPS).

The rest of the conversion is mechanical. Once the signature or key is sorted out, the spec change is the same as for other packages: %{gpgverify} → %{openpgpverify} and BuildRequires: openpgpverify. I'm happy to send the PR.

(The check was run with scripts from https://github.com/Jakuje/openpgpverify-migration.)

Comment 1 Martin Osvald 🛹 2026-11-20 13:27:29 UTC
Since ISC DHCP is EOL and no further releases are expected, does it make sense to disable source code verification to solve this?