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As part of the Fedora 45 Change Sequoia openpgpverify (https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/Sequoia_openpgpverify), %gpgverify (GnuPG) is being replaced by %openpgpverify (Sequoia sqv). For dhcp, the switch can't be done in a simple PR: %gpgverify accepts the current upstream signature, but %openpgpverify rejects it. Failing check (dist-git commit ba61518c3ee6): %openpgpverify --keyring=codesign2021.txt --signature=dhcp-4.4.3-P1.tar.gz.asc --data=dhcp-4.4.3-P1.tar.gz Verifying signature: Policy rejected non-revocation signature (Binary) requiring collision resistance because: SHA1 is not considered secure 0 of 1 signatures are valid (threshold is: 1). openpgpverify: Signature verification failed. Why: The release signature (SHA-1, made 2022-09-28) is by the subkey AADBBA5074F1402F7B69D56BC5B4EE931A9F9DFD (RSA 4096 bits) of the key 7E1C91AC8030A5A59D1EFAB9750F3C87723E4012 (RSA 4096 bits). sqv reports only the first problem it hits (above). All the problems found: - The release signature itself uses SHA-1. SHA-1 is no longer considered secure: collisions have been practical since 2017 (SHAttered) and chosen-prefix collisions since 2020 (SHA-1 is a Shambles), and the crypto policy rejects it; for signatures over data, this won't be relaxed. The key itself is fine. What can be done: - Ask upstream to sign releases with SHA-256 or better, ideally with a current key. - Until then the package can keep %gpgverify, or verify the tarball differently (for example against a checksum published over HTTPS). The rest of the conversion is mechanical. Once the signature or key is sorted out, the spec change is the same as for other packages: %{gpgverify} → %{openpgpverify} and BuildRequires: openpgpverify. I'm happy to send the PR. (The check was run with scripts from https://github.com/Jakuje/openpgpverify-migration.)
Since ISC DHCP is EOL and no further releases are expected, does it make sense to disable source code verification to solve this?