Bug 2574391 (CVE-2026-130644)

Summary: CVE-2026-130644 ansible-core: ansible-core: ansible-galaxy collection install path traversal via unvalidated artifact-derived collection name allows file writes and directory deletion outside the collections path
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security <prodsec-ir-bot>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: medium Docs Contact:
Priority: medium    
Version: unspecifiedCC: akhatavk, aos-team-art-private, asdas, brasmith, cahl, cochase, dpaolell, dranck, dymurray, eglynn, ehelms, gbenhaim, gparvin, jbalunas, jdelft, jjoyce, jlanda, jmitchel, jpasqual, jpretori, jschluet, jupierce, juwatts, jwong, kbempah, kshier, lblicha, lbrazdil, lgarciaa, lhh, ljawale, mattdavi, mbiarnes, mburns, mclay, mgarciac, mhulan, mminar, mrunge, msilmser, niyer, ogajduse, osousa, ppalepu, ppostler, prdhamdh, rbiba, rbobbitt, rchan, rhaigner, rhel-process-autobot, sghai, sidsharm, simaishi, sivel, smallamp, solenoci, sskracic, stcannon, suppawar, tguha, tpfromme, tsze, twaugh, vimartin, vlaad, watson-tool-maintainers, yguenane, zhunting
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
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Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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A path traversal flaw was found in ansible-core. When installing a collection with ansible-galaxy collection install, the install destination directory is derived from the namespace and name fields declared inside the collection artifact's own metadata, which are not validated as well-formed collection identifiers or checked for path containment. A malicious collection artifact -- delivered as a local file, a remote URL, a source directory, a git repository, or as a dependency -- can use a crafted name value to redirect the install destination outside the configured collections path, causing ansible-galaxy to delete an existing directory writable by the invoking user and then write attacker-controlled files to that location.
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-11-17 14:29:53 UTC
A flaw was found in ansible-core. When installing a collection with `ansible-galaxy collection install`, the install destination directory is derived from the `namespace` and `name` fields declared inside the collection artifact's own metadata (`MANIFEST.json`'s `collection_info`, or `galaxy.yml` for directory- or git-sourced installs), without validating that these values are well-formed collection identifiers or confirming that the resulting path stays within the configured collections directory. A specially crafted collection artifact can set an absolute-path or traversal-style `name` value that redirects the install destination outside the collections path. Before extracting the artifact's contents, `ansible-galaxy` removes any pre-existing directory at the computed destination and then writes the artifact's files there. An attacker able to get a user or an automated process to run `ansible-galaxy collection install` against a malicious artifact -- supplied as a local file, a remote URL, a source directory, a git repository, or referenced as a dependency -- can cause deletion of an existing directory writable by the invoking user and creation of attacker-controlled files at that same location, outside the collections directory. Collection signature verification is optional and does not prevent this issue.