Fedora Account System
Red Hat Associate
Red Hat Customer
A flaw was found in ansible-core. When installing a collection with `ansible-galaxy collection install`, the install destination directory is derived from the `namespace` and `name` fields declared inside the collection artifact's own metadata (`MANIFEST.json`'s `collection_info`, or `galaxy.yml` for directory- or git-sourced installs), without validating that these values are well-formed collection identifiers or confirming that the resulting path stays within the configured collections directory. A specially crafted collection artifact can set an absolute-path or traversal-style `name` value that redirects the install destination outside the collections path. Before extracting the artifact's contents, `ansible-galaxy` removes any pre-existing directory at the computed destination and then writes the artifact's files there. An attacker able to get a user or an automated process to run `ansible-galaxy collection install` against a malicious artifact -- supplied as a local file, a remote URL, a source directory, a git repository, or referenced as a dependency -- can cause deletion of an existing directory writable by the invoking user and creation of attacker-controlled files at that same location, outside the collections directory. Collection signature verification is optional and does not prevent this issue.