Bug 2577833 (CVE-2026-99800)
| Summary: | CVE-2026-99800 kernel: kernel: Privilege escalation via use-after-free in io_uring | ||
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| Product: | [Other] Security Response | Reporter: | OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport> |
| Component: | vulnerability | Assignee: | Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev> |
| Status: | NEW --- | QA Contact: | |
| Severity: | high | Docs Contact: | |
| Priority: | high | ||
| Version: | unspecified | CC: | akhatavk, aos-team-art-private, asdas, dpaolell, jdelft, jupierce, lgarciaa, mbiarnes, ppalepu, ppostler, prdhamdh, rhel-process-autobot, sghai, sidsharm, suppawar, vlaad, watson-tool-maintainers |
| Target Milestone: | --- | Keywords: | Security |
| Target Release: | --- | ||
| Hardware: | All | ||
| OS: | Linux | ||
| Whiteboard: | |||
| Fixed In Version: | Doc Type: | --- | |
| Doc Text: |
A flaw was found in the Linux kernel's io_uring subsystem. A race condition can occur when a secondary task completes or cleans up a request while the owning process exits, causing the task context to be freed prematurely while still being accessed. A local user could exploit this vulnerability to cause a use-after-free condition, potentially leading to privilege escalation or a Denial of Service (DoS) via a kernel crash.
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Story Points: | --- |
| Clone Of: | Environment: | ||
| Last Closed: | Type: | --- | |
| Regression: | --- | Mount Type: | --- |
| Documentation: | --- | CRM: | |
| Verified Versions: | Category: | --- | |
| oVirt Team: | --- | RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host: | |
| Cloudforms Team: | --- | Target Upstream Version: | |
| Embargoed: | |||
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: io_uring: free the task context after a grace period A task other than the owner can free a request, io_ring_exit_work() running the local task_work of a DEFER_TASKRUN ring for example, or io_do_iopoll() reaping completions. io_put_task() then takes the else branch: percpu_counter_sub(&tctx->inflight, 1); if (unlikely(atomic_read(&tctx->in_cancel))) wake_up(&tctx->wait); put_task_struct(tctx->task); The first line is what lets the owner leave io_uring_cancel_generic(), and on exec it frees the tctx right after. Nothing holds that off for the remaining three lines, the task reference only covers a tctx freed along with the task_struct. It used to work out because io_uring_del_tctx_node() took the uring_lock that the freeing side holds across io_put_task(), until that moved to tctx_lock. Free the tctx with kfree_rcu(), and enter an RCU read section in io_put_task() before the count is dropped.