Bug 2577833 (CVE-2026-99800) - CVE-2026-99800 kernel: kernel: Privilege escalation via use-after-free in io_uring
Summary: CVE-2026-99800 kernel: kernel: Privilege escalation via use-after-free in io_...
Keywords:
Status: NEW
Alias: CVE-2026-99800
Product: Security Response
Classification: Other
Component: vulnerability
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: Linux
high
high
Target Milestone: ---
Assignee: Product Security DevOps Team
QA Contact:
URL:
Whiteboard:
Depends On:
Blocks:
TreeView+ depends on / blocked
 
Reported: 2026-11-20 07:21 UTC by OSIDB Bzimport
Modified: 2026-11-20 11:19 UTC (History)
17 users (show)

Fixed In Version:
Clone Of:
Environment:
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-11-20 07:21:24 UTC
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

io_uring: free the task context after a grace period

A task other than the owner can free a request, io_ring_exit_work()
running the local task_work of a DEFER_TASKRUN ring for example, or
io_do_iopoll() reaping completions. io_put_task() then takes the else
branch:

    percpu_counter_sub(&tctx->inflight, 1);
    if (unlikely(atomic_read(&tctx->in_cancel)))
            wake_up(&tctx->wait);
    put_task_struct(tctx->task);

The first line is what lets the owner leave io_uring_cancel_generic(),
and on exec it frees the tctx right after. Nothing holds that off for
the remaining three lines, the task reference only covers a tctx freed
along with the task_struct. It used to work out because
io_uring_del_tctx_node() took the uring_lock that the freeing side holds
across io_put_task(), until that moved to tctx_lock.

Free the tctx with kfree_rcu(), and enter an RCU read section in
io_put_task() before the count is dropped.


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