Bug 2578653 (CVE-2026-133879)

Summary: CVE-2026-133879 kubevirt: containerized-data-importer: kubevirt/CDI: cross-namespace PVC clone authorization bypass via user-controlled checkStaticVolume DataVolume annotation
Product: [Other] Security Response Reporter: OSIDB Bzimport <bzimport>
Component: vulnerabilityAssignee: Product Security DevOps Team <prodsec-dev>
Status: NEW --- QA Contact:
Severity: high Docs Contact:
Priority: high    
Version: unspecifiedCC: dkeler, suppawar, thason
Target Milestone: ---Keywords: Security
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Hardware: All   
OS: Linux   
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A flaw was found in KubeVirt/containerized-data-importer. When a VirtualMachine with an embedded DataVolumeTemplate carrying the cdi.kubevirt.io/storage.checkStaticVolume annotation and a cross-namespace clone source is created by a tenant, the service-account clone authorization check can be bypassed, allowing a PVC from another namespace to be cloned into the tenant's namespace without the required permissions. This can result in cross-tenant data disclosure.
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oVirt Team: --- RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
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Description OSIDB Bzimport 2026-11-20 15:46:08 UTC
A flaw was found in kubevirt/containerized-data-importer. A tenant who can create or update a VirtualMachine in their own namespace can set the cdi.kubevirt.io/storage.checkStaticVolume annotation on an embedded DataVolumeTemplate together with a cross-namespace clone source. The VM admission check (validateVirtualMachineDataVolumeTemplateNamespace) only validates the DataVolume's own namespace and does not restrict annotations or spec.source.pvc.namespace, so the request passes. The annotation is propagated onto the generated DataVolume, where AuthorizeSA treats it as noTokenOkay and converts a failed service-account clone-authorization SubjectAccessReview into an allowed result (ErrNoTokenOkay), which virt-controller accepts. virt-controller then creates the clone DataVolume on the tenant's behalf, and CDI - which proceeds with normal population when no statically provisioned PV is found - can clone the victim namespace's PVC into the attacker's namespace, resulting in cross-tenant data disclosure.