Bug 638427 (CVE-2010-3394)
| Summary: | CVE-2010-3394 TeXmacs: insecure library loading vulnerability | ||
|---|---|---|---|
| Product: | [Other] Security Response | Reporter: | Vincent Danen <vdanen> |
| Component: | vulnerability | Assignee: | Red Hat Product Security <security-response-team> |
| Status: | CLOSED ERRATA | QA Contact: | |
| Severity: | low | Docs Contact: | |
| Priority: | low | ||
| Version: | unspecified | CC: | gemi, novyjindrich, tremble |
| Target Milestone: | --- | Keywords: | Security |
| Target Release: | --- | ||
| Hardware: | All | ||
| OS: | Linux | ||
| Whiteboard: | |||
| Fixed In Version: | Doc Type: | Bug Fix | |
| Doc Text: | Story Points: | --- | |
| Clone Of: | Environment: | ||
| Last Closed: | 2021-10-19 09:15:00 UTC | Type: | --- |
| Regression: | --- | Mount Type: | --- |
| Documentation: | --- | CRM: | |
| Verified Versions: | Category: | --- | |
| oVirt Team: | --- | RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host: | |
| Cloudforms Team: | --- | Target Upstream Version: | |
| Embargoed: | |||
| Bug Depends On: | 638428, 1058553 | ||
| Bug Blocks: | |||
Created TeXmacs tracking bugs for this issue Affects: fedora-all [bug 638428] This one-liner should work as an alternative to if-else-fi fix:
export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/usr/lib/foo${LD_LIBRARY_PATH:+:$LD_LIBRARY_PATH}
From manual inspection it looks like TeXmacs in EPEL is affected by this issue. I will file tracking bugs shortly. Created TeXmacs tracking bugs for this issue: Affects: epel-all [bug 1058553] TeXmacs-1.0.7.2-3.el5 has been pushed to the Fedora EPEL 5 stable repository. If problems still persist, please make note of it in this bug report. TeXmacs-1.0.7.2-3.el6 has been pushed to the Fedora EPEL 6 stable repository. If problems still persist, please make note of it in this bug report. |
Raphael Geissert conducted a review of various packages in Debian and found that TeXmacs contained two scripts that could be abused by an attacker to execute arbitrary code [1]. The vulnerability is due to an insecure change to LD_LIBRARY_PATH, and environment variable used by ld.so(8) to look for libraries in directories other than the standard paths. When there is an empty item in the colon-separated list of directories in LD_LIBRARY_PATH, ld.so(8) treats it as a '.' (current working directory). If the given script is executed from a directory where a local attacker could write files, there is a chance for exploitation. In Fedora, /usr/bin/TeXmacs re-sets LD_LIBRARY_PATH insecurely: LD_LIBRARY_PATH="$TEXMACS_BIN_PATH/lib${LD_LIBRARY_PATH+":$LD_LIBRARY_PATH"}" export LD_LIBRARY_PATH and so does /usr/libexec/TeXmacs/bin/tm_mupad_help: LD_LIBRARY_PATH=$LD_LIBRARY_PATH:${MuPAD_ROOT_PATH}/${SYSINFO}/lib:/usr/local/X11R6/motif-2.0/lib:/usr/local/X11R6/lib:$MuPAD_ROOT_PATH/$SYSINFO/bin export LD_LIBRARY_PATH A solution is to patch the scripts to test if $LD_LIBRARY_PATH is set first before attempting to modify it: if [ -z ${LD_LIBRARY_PATH} ]; then export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/usr/lib/foo else export LD_LIBRARY_PATH=/usr/lib/foo:${LD_LIBRARY_PATH} fi This issue has been assigned the name CVE-2010-3394. [1] http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=598424