From Bugzilla Helper: User-Agent: Mozilla/4.0 (compatible; MSIE 6.0; Linux 2.4.21-grsec i686) Opera 7.11 [en] Description of problem: If the KRB5CCNAME environment variable is set when root starts/restarts xinetd all ticket file cache names for all users will be set to this name. Furthermore it appears that in some cases if the ticket cache already exists then klogind will set the ownership to the user logging in, however the contents of the cache (e.g. the ticket) can contain another users credentials such that user A owns the cache which contains users B credentials. Version-Release number of selected component (if applicable): xinetd-2.3.11-1.8.0 How reproducible: Always Steps to Reproduce: 1.rlogin to any box running klogind from xinetd as root 2.echo $KRB5CCNAME 3./etc/init.d/xinetd restart 4.rlogin to the same box as a normal user 5. run the klist command or echo $KRB5CCNAME. It will be the same as in step 2. Actual Results: [root@dragon root]# id uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root),1(bin),2(daemon),3(sys),4(adm) ,6(disk),10(wheel) [root@dragon root]# klist klist: No credentials cache found (ticket cache FILE: /tmp/krb5cc_p917) Kerberos 4 ticket cache: /tmp/tkt0 klist: You have no tickets cached [root@dragon root]# and as a regular user: [15:49:41][avery@dragon:~]$ id uid=253(avery) gid=100(users) groups=100(users),101(olbdev), 106(portdev),110(olbops),117(sysops) [15:50:24][avery@dragon:~]$ klist klist: No credentials cache found (ticket cache FILE: /tmp/krb5cc_p917) Kerberos 4 ticket cache: /tmp/tkt253 klist: You have no tickets cached [15:50:25][avery@dragon:~]$ Expected Results: Root should have a unique ticket cache as should every user. Additional info: having the following in the init script for xinetd after the test for root would be good: [ ! -z ${KRB5CCNAME} ] && unset KRB5CCNAME
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I am removing a Security keyword, for I think this has no security implication. Environment variables, although I agree xinetd should saintize environmnentt, contain no security sensitive information. Also, does this bug still exist?
I'm closing this bug as WONTFIX for following reasons: no activity for a long time, low impact and from the last comment no security implications. Since only 4.9 will be regular release, this bug will most likely be unapproved. I recommend switching to RHEL5, the issue might be fixed there.