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Description of problem:

The /usr/bin/docker binary currently has 15MB and runs under root. For various security and audit-ability reasons, the binary should be split into smaller, at least two, parts - a privileged part (running under root) and an unprivileged part (running under an unprivileged user).

Version-Release number of selected component (if applicable):
docker-1.0.0-9.el7.x86_64

This would have to be totally handled upstream.

FYI: This seems to be one of Docker's "end goals", as described in the Security section of the upstream documentation:

--------------------------------------------------------------------

The end goal for Docker is therefore to implement two additional security
improvements:

   - map the root user of a container to a non-root user of the Docker host,
     to mitigate the effects of a container-to-host privilege escalation;
   - allow the Docker daemon to run without root privileges, and delegate
     operations requiring those privileges to well-audited sub-processes,
     each with its own (very limited) scope: virtual network setup,
     filesystem management, etc.

--------------------------------------------------------------------

https://docs.docker.com/articles/security/

The first one is about User Namespace.   The second one is potential, although I think this is very low on their priority list.

This continues to be talked about upstream, but not sure there is any action on it.

This needs to happen upstream.  We are looking at potential other tools like CoreOS and systemd-dkr.