Bug 1152545 – CVE-2014-3700 eDeploy: Remote code execution due to eval() of untrusted data

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Bug 1152545 - (CVE-2014-3700) CVE-2014-3700 eDeploy: Remote code execution due to eval() of untrusted data

Summary:	CVE-2014-3700 eDeploy: Remote code execution due to eval() of untrusted data

Status:	CLOSED UPSTREAM

Aliases:	CVE-2014-3700

Product:	Security Response
Classification:	Other
Component:	vulnerability (Show other bugs)
Sub Component:
Version:	unspecified
Hardware:	All Linux

Priority	high Severity high
Target Milestone:	---
Target Release:	---
Assigned To:	Red Hat Product Security
QA Contact:
Docs Contact:

URL:
Whiteboard:	impact=important,public=20150317,repo...
Keywords:	Security

Depends On:
Blocks:	1152549
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Reported:	2014-10-14 07:44 EDT by David Jorm
Modified:	2015-03-19 00:17 EDT (History)
CC List:	6 users (show)

See Also:
Fixed In Version:
Doc Type:	Bug Fix
Doc Text:
Story Points:	---
Clone Of:
Environment:
Last Closed:	2015-03-17 19:27:18 EDT
Type:	---
Regression:	---
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Documentation:	---
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oVirt Team:	---
RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
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Description David Jorm 2014-10-14 07:44:59 EDT

It was found that multiple code paths in eDeploy would call eval() with unsantized user-supplied input. A remote attacker could exploit this to execute arbitrary code on the eDeploy server.

Comment 1 David Jorm 2014-10-14 07:45:40 EDT

Acknowledgements:

This issue was discovered by Andrew Griffiths of Red Hat Product Security.

Comment 3 Kurt Seifried 2015-03-17 15:48:17 EDT

Summary:
  Multiple eval() usages, leading to arbitrary code execution on servers and clients (in mitm type attacks).

  Unsafe directory handling situations, filename handling. Should introduce whitelisting.

Solution:
  Comprehensive security training, with initial targets identified by github commit
  logs :-)  

upload-health.py:        hw_items = eval(hw_file.read(-1))
upload.py:        hw_items = eval(hw_file.read(-1))

hw_file is specified to the cgi script via 

$ curl -i -F name=test -F file=@/tmp/hw.lst http://localhost/cgi-bin/upload.py
$ curl -i -F name=test -F file=@/tmp/hw.lst http://localhost/cgi-bin/upload.py

respectively. allows arbitrary python code execution

matcher.py:        lst = eval('(' + _list + ')')

need to trace the code flow for _list, but .. probably vuln.

Comment 4 Kurt Seifried 2015-03-17 19:26:29 EDT

This is now filed publicly https://github.com/enovance/edeploy/issues/233

Comment 5 Kurt Seifried 2015-03-17 19:27:18 EDT

This is now filed publicly https://github.com/enovance/edeploy/issues/233

Comment 6 Kurt Seifried 2015-03-19 00:17:04 EDT

Statement:

Red Hat does not currently ship eNovance edeploy in a product form and as such this issue has been filed upstream.

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