Note: This bug is displayed in read-only format because
the product is no longer active in Red Hat Bugzilla.
RHEL Engineering is moving the tracking of its product development work on RHEL 6 through RHEL 9 to Red Hat Jira (issues.redhat.com). If you're a Red Hat customer, please continue to file support cases via the Red Hat customer portal. If you're not, please head to the "RHEL project" in Red Hat Jira and file new tickets here. Individual Bugzilla bugs in the statuses "NEW", "ASSIGNED", and "POST" are being migrated throughout September 2023. Bugs of Red Hat partners with an assigned Engineering Partner Manager (EPM) are migrated in late September as per pre-agreed dates. Bugs against components "kernel", "kernel-rt", and "kpatch" are only migrated if still in "NEW" or "ASSIGNED". If you cannot log in to RH Jira, please consult article #7032570. That failing, please send an e-mail to the RH Jira admins at rh-issues@redhat.com to troubleshoot your issue as a user management inquiry. The email creates a ServiceNow ticket with Red Hat. Individual Bugzilla bugs that are migrated will be moved to status "CLOSED", resolution "MIGRATED", and set with "MigratedToJIRA" in "Keywords". The link to the successor Jira issue will be found under "Links", have a little "two-footprint" icon next to it, and direct you to the "RHEL project" in Red Hat Jira (issue links are of type "https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-XXXX", where "X" is a digit). This same link will be available in a blue banner at the top of the page informing you that that bug has been migrated.
DescriptionJan Pokorný [poki]
2014-10-23 17:20:08 UTC
Due to an ever-increasing attention being paid to minimal acceptable
version of SSL/TLS and/or their ciphers (security scanners, etc.)
and because {luci,ccs,ccs_sync}-ricci communication should be just
fine with TLS1.0+.
While the original [bug 1075176] conditionally disables SSLv2, I think
we should:
- treat SSLv3 the same as SSLv3
- invert the respective default: go secure and allow to revert to
previous behavior (for the utterly
obscure use cases)
To be noted that relying merely on security scanners tends to provide
false sense of overall security; certificate management (conga using
self-signed ones with limited options to roll up custom ones) is a much
weaker point here (see also [bz885028]).
+++ This bug was initially created as a clone of Bug #1075176 +++
Comment 1Jan Pokorný [poki]
2014-10-23 18:43:48 UTC
Principially, [bug 1156167] is of greater concerns, though;
this is generally non-critical.
How to test (from the machine that is running ricci):
openssl s_client -connect localhost:11111 -ssl3
If it give you a bunch of output including certificates, etc. and returns '0' then ssl3 is working.
After upgrading ricci running the same openssl command returns '1' and gives you errors like this:
SSL_connect:before/connect initialization
SSL_connect:SSLv3 write client hello A
SSL3 alert read:fatal:handshake failure
SSL_connect:failed in SSLv3 read server hello A
140548945856328:error:14094410:SSL routines:SSL3_READ_BYTES:sslv3 alert handshake failure:s3_pkt.c:1256:SSL alert number 40
Patch upstream here:
https://git.fedorahosted.org/cgit/conga.git/commit/?h=RHEL6&id=636787356206e592367843d66d3a834225bb1625
Since the problem described in this bug report should be
resolved in a recent advisory, it has been closed with a
resolution of ERRATA.
For information on the advisory, and where to find the updated
files, follow the link below.
If the solution does not work for you, open a new bug report.
https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHBA-2015-1405.html
Due to an ever-increasing attention being paid to minimal acceptable version of SSL/TLS and/or their ciphers (security scanners, etc.) and because {luci,ccs,ccs_sync}-ricci communication should be just fine with TLS1.0+. While the original [bug 1075176] conditionally disables SSLv2, I think we should: - treat SSLv3 the same as SSLv3 - invert the respective default: go secure and allow to revert to previous behavior (for the utterly obscure use cases) To be noted that relying merely on security scanners tends to provide false sense of overall security; certificate management (conga using self-signed ones with limited options to roll up custom ones) is a much weaker point here (see also [bz885028]). +++ This bug was initially created as a clone of Bug #1075176 +++