Description of problem: Every application run in a sandbox can read /etc/passwd . In most cases this is a bad idea for a sandboxed application. Probably many other directories should be sandbox-local.
Why is being able to read /etc/passwd a bad idea? It is not /etc/shadow that contains the password hashes...
It should not be possible for a sandboxed app to read out full list of users including real names for example. I was not claiming this was the worst that a possibly misbehaving app in a sandbox could do. As it is now sandboxed apps get access to every file in /etc, /proc, /dev, /tmp, /var and probably a few more for which the user has the rights.
(In reply to Till Maas from comment #1) > Why is being able to read /etc/passwd a bad idea? It is not /etc/shadow that > contains the password hashes... Why is a good idea? Only passwords are significant? Usernames are the best sources for social engineering.
This bug appears to have been reported against 'rawhide' during the Fedora 22 development cycle. Changing version to '22'. More information and reason for this action is here: https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_Program_Management/HouseKeeping/Fedora22
Fedora 22 changed to end-of-life (EOL) status on 2016-07-19. Fedora 22 is no longer maintained, which means that it will not receive any further security or bug fix updates. As a result we are closing this bug. If you can reproduce this bug against a currently maintained version of Fedora please feel free to reopen this bug against that version. If you are unable to reopen this bug, please file a new report against the current release. If you experience problems, please add a comment to this bug. Thank you for reporting this bug and we are sorry it could not be fixed.
I think this should be reopened against rawhide?