Bug 1166910 (CVE-2014-8104) - CVE-2014-8104 openvpn: authenticated user can DoS OpenVPN by sending a too-short control channel packet to server
Summary: CVE-2014-8104 openvpn: authenticated user can DoS OpenVPN by sending a too-sh...
Keywords:
Status: CLOSED ERRATA
Alias: CVE-2014-8104
Product: Security Response
Classification: Other
Component: vulnerability
Version: unspecified
Hardware: All
OS: Linux
medium
medium
Target Milestone: ---
Assignee: Red Hat Product Security
QA Contact:
URL:
Whiteboard:
Depends On: 1169487 1169488
Blocks: 1166911
TreeView+ depends on / blocked
 
Reported: 2014-11-21 23:12 UTC by Vincent Danen
Modified: 2019-09-29 13:24 UTC (History)
5 users (show)

Fixed In Version: openvpn 2.3.6
Doc Type: Bug Fix
Doc Text:
Clone Of:
Environment:
Last Closed: 2014-12-18 21:17:32 UTC


Attachments (Terms of Use)
upstream patch (1.32 KB, patch)
2014-11-21 23:16 UTC, Vincent Danen
no flags Details | Diff

Description Vincent Danen 2014-11-21 23:12:37 UTC
It was discovered that an authenticated client could trigger an ASSERT() in OpenVPN by sending a too-short control channel packet to the server.  This could cause the OpenVPN server to crash and deny access to the VPN to other legitimate users.


Acknowledgements:

Red Hat would like to thank the OpenVPN project for reporting this issue.  Upstream acknowledges Dragana Damjanovic as the original reporter.

Comment 1 Vincent Danen 2014-11-21 23:16:38 UTC
Created attachment 960011 [details]
upstream patch

Comment 4 Vincent Danen 2014-12-01 19:30:33 UTC
External References:

http://community.openvpn.net/openvpn/wiki/SecurityAnnouncement-97597e732b

Comment 5 Vincent Danen 2014-12-01 19:32:58 UTC
Created openvpn tracking bugs for this issue:

Affects: fedora-all [bug 1169487]
Affects: epel-all [bug 1169488]

Comment 6 Vincent Danen 2014-12-01 19:34:06 UTC
Note that an update has been submitted for Fedora 21:

https://admin.fedoraproject.org/updates/openvpn-2.3.6-1.fc21

Also note the following mitigating factors from the upstream announcement:

"""
Only tls-authenticated clients can trigger the vulnerability in the OpenVPN server. Thus both client certificates and TLS auth will protect against this exploit as long as all OpenVPN clients can be trusted to not be compromised and/or malicious. Note that username/password authentication does not protect against this exploit, and servers using --client-cert-not-required by definition have no client certificates to protect against this exploit.

In particular VPN service providers are affected, because anyone can get their hands on the necessary client certificates and TLS auth keys.
"""


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