Description of problem:
improve the manual of seccomp_init about "the process"

Version-Release number of selected component (if applicable):
libseccomp-2.1.1-2.el7.x86_64

How reproducible:
100%

Steps to Reproduce:
1.# man seccomp_init
...
       SCMP_ACT_KILL
              The process will be killed by the kernel when it calls a syscall that does not match any of the configured seccomp filter rules.

       SCMP_ACT_TRAP
              The process will throw a SIGSYS signal when it calls a syscall that does not match any of the configured seccomp filter rules.

       SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(uint16_t errno)
              The process will receive a return value of errno when it calls a syscall that does not match any of the configured seccomp filter rules.
...
2.
3.

Actual results:
from man of libseccomp , it said "the process will be killed" after i do some test and check the manual of prctl(), i think it should be "the thread"

Expected results:
should give a more clearly manual for libseccomp

Additional info:

# man prctl
      PR_SET_SECCOMP (since Linux 2.6.23)
              Set the secure computing (seccomp) mode for the calling thread, to limit the available system calls.  The seccomp mode is selected via arg2.  (The seccomp constants are defined in <linux/sec‐
              comp.h>.)

              With arg2 set to SECCOMP_MODE_STRICT the only system calls that the thread is permitted to make are read(2), write(2), _exit(2), and sigreturn(2).  Other system calls result in  the  delivery
              of a SIGKILL signal.  Strict secure computing mode is useful for number-crunching applications that may need to execute untrusted byte code, perhaps obtained by reading from a pipe or socket.
              This operation is available only if the kernel is configured with CONFIG_SECCOMP enabled.

              With arg2 set to SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER (since Linux 3.5) the system calls allowed are defined by a pointer to a Berkeley Packet Filter passed in arg3.  This argument  is  a  pointer  to  struct
              sock_fprog; it can be designed to filter arbitrary system calls and system call arguments.  This mode is available only if the kernel is configured with CONFIG_SECCOMP_FILTER enabled.

              If  SECCOMP_MODE_FILTER  filters  permit  fork(2),  then  the  seccomp  mode  is inherited by children created by fork(2); if execve(2) is permitted, then the seccomp mode is preserved across
              execve(2).  If the filters permit prctl() calls, then additional filters can be added; they are run in order until the first non-allow result is seen.

              For further information, see the kernel source file Documentation/prctl/seccomp_filter.txt.