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Every application/service that links to libgcrypt due to the recent FIPS requirements changes will read from the /dev/urandom device initial seed for the internal libgcrypt RNG. This behaviour happens only when /etc/system-fips file is present, that is the dracut-fips package is installed. But it happens regardless oft the kernel fips mode.
Please also consider making the access to /dev/urandom permissive in general because there is no harm when domains read from it. Note that this doesn't apply to /dev/random where the read drains the kernel entropy pool. The access to /dev/random should still stay confined. We might possibly need to make it also permissible by a boolean switch but that is debatable.
Already fixed.
commit d924a23d37010a17f954c89a98a350639328de8c
Author: Miroslav Grepl <mgrepl>
Date: Mon Apr 13 09:54:38 2015 +0200
Allow all domains to read /dev/urandom. It is needed by all apps/services linked to libgcrypt. There is no harm to allow it by default. (BZ#1204069)
Since the problem described in this bug report should be
resolved in a recent advisory, it has been closed with a
resolution of ERRATA.
For information on the advisory, and where to find the updated
files, follow the link below.
If the solution does not work for you, open a new bug report.
https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHBA-2015-2300.html