The AAVMF firmware binaries currently include the secure boot feature / infrastructure. However, in aarch64 / "virt" virtual machines, the UEFI varstore pflash chip cannot be protected with virtual hardware means from a malicious runtime guest OS. (In OVMF's case (x86_64), this is solved by using SMM, but for aarch64, anything similar in that direction lies pretty far out.)
The false sense of security that could arise from AAVMF's secure boot infrastructure has been deemed to outweigh the guest OS development / testing features that the same enables. Therefore, in the next rebase of the "ovmf" SRPM, the secure boot feature should be removed from AAVMF.
Consequently, the sub-package's "License:" tag, the license files that the sub-package installs, and the TianoCore splash screen that AAVMF shows, should all be adapted to the lack of OpenSSL in the AAVMF binaries.
Agree with this change. Ultimately, one assumes a virtual EL3 (Secure World) akin to SMM will be used to protect the flash content from the VM OS.
This was fixed in RHEL-ALT-7.3.