A missing variable initialization in phar_make_dirstream() and not properly checking return values when parsing malicious .tar file allows an attacker, that could control stack frame at the moment before calling zend_hash_get_current_key_ex(), to take over variables str_key and key_len and could cause a DoS or has other impact. Upstream bug: https://bugs.php.net/bug.php?id=71331 Upstream patch: http://git.php.net/?p=php-src.git;a=commitdiff;h=9649ca1630433473a307d015ba1a79a4a7a779f5 CVE assignment: http://seclists.org/oss-sec/2016/q2/163
Created php tracking bugs for this issue: Affects: fedora-all [bug 1332455]
This issue is triggered by a specially-crafted Tar format Phar files. Phar files are distribution format for PHP applications (similar to Java Jar format) and their content is typically executed on the server. Malicious Phar archive can therefore execute code on the system without exploiting any parsing issues. If Phar extension is not used, it can be disabled by commenting out the following line: extension=phar.so in /etc/php.d/phar.ini to prevent loading of the extension.
This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat Software Collections for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6 Red Hat Software Collections for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 6.7 EUS Red Hat Software Collections for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Red Hat Software Collections for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.2 EUS Red Hat Software Collections for Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.3 EUS Via RHSA-2016:2750 https://rhn.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2016-2750.html