Description of problem: I created a custom yum repository, to keep things secure I am running it over SSL using a signed cert from our Company Root-CA. On box I have added the repository to the /etc/sysconfig/rhn/sources and the Root CA to the /usr/share/rhn/RHNS-CA-CERT and all seemed good. I tested up2date on a box where I had NOT added the rootca to the /usr/share/rhn/RHNS-CA-CERT file and it also worked with no visible erros to screen or to logs about it being unable to validate the cert on my https reopsitory. Version-Release number of selected component (if applicable): up2date-4.2.38-1 How reproducible: Always Steps to Reproduce: 1. add repository yum dw-custom https://URL-TO-REPO to rhn/sources 2. do NOT add RootCA to RHNS-CA-CERT 3. up2date -l; up2date -u pkgname Actual results: up2date pulls headers/installs packages without complaining that it cannot verify the SSL cert Expected results: some error to screen/log that it can not verify the SSL Cert due to a missing CA and then exit
Almost a month with no comment from RH, can I please get an update?
2 month no comments. this is a potential security issue as it would appear that there is no validation of the RootCA
CA certs are only verified for rhn repos (aka, default configs). Any other repos use http or unverified https.
escalating this bug as a security concern, with up2date running unverified https it opens repo's up to being hijacked and having arbatraty/malicious packages installed on users machines. I can list many scenarios where this can be exploited under the right circumstances. please correct this issue and add rootCA verification for up2date to ensure the validity of the SSL connection for Repo's other then RHN.
I'm removing the security severity on this issue. Trusting up2date to verify a connection is not secure. The reason package are GPG signed is to ensure that no matter the transport layer, the package is from who you think it's from. If you place complete trust in your yum repository, even though you have a valid SSL cert, the server could be compromised and malicious packages placed on it. Trusting the GPG package signatures ensures this is not a problem.
This is not an issue for me, we do GPG sign all our RPM's but I would worry a lot of people out there with custom repo's would not be going to the same length using GPG, and configuring up2date to use the --nosig option(the UseGPG option in up2date --configure) and ignore GPG trusting in SSL which they might believe is validated. It's inconsistant behaviour, up2date will validate the RHN Cert and refuse to work if it can not validate that cert, one would presume (incorrectly) that if it validates the RHN cert that ssl cert validation would be a default behaviour for the program. I'll switch this to an RFE, I still consider this issue something which should be looked into.
This bug is filed against RHEL 3, which is in maintenance phase. During the maintenance phase, only security errata and select mission critical bug fixes will be released for enterprise products. Since this bug does not meet that criteria, it is now being closed. For more information of the RHEL errata support policy, please visit: http://www.redhat.com/security/updates/errata/ If you feel this bug is indeed mission critical, please contact your support representative. You may be asked to provide detailed information on how this bug is affecting you.