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.NSS now supports keys restricted to RSASSA-PSS
The Network Security Services (NSS) library now supports keys restricted to Rivest–Shamir–Adleman Signature Scheme with Appendix – Probabilistic Signature Scheme (RSASSA-PSS). The legacy signature scheme, Public Key Cryptography Standard #1 (PKCS#1) v1.5, permits the keys to be reused for encrypting data or keys. This makes those keys vulnerable to signature forging attacks published by Bleichenbacher. Restricting the keys to the RSASSA-PSS algorithm makes them resilient to attacks that utilize decryption.
With this update, NSS can be configured to support keys which are restricted to the RSASSA-PSS algorithm only. This enables the use of such keys included in X.509 certificates for both server and client authentication in TLS 1.2 and 1.3.
Created attachment 1262017[details]
ca and server certificates
Description of problem:
When server signs Server Key Exchange message using RSA-PSS key, the NSS client rejects it as having inadequate key usage
Version-Release number of selected component (if applicable):
nss-3.28.3-3.el7.x86_64
How reproducible:
always
Steps to Reproduce:
1. Setup server with attached server/key.pem and server/cert.pem
2. Create nssdb with ca/cert.pem certificate marked as trusted
3. tstclnt -d sql:./nssdb/ -h 127.0.0.1 -p 4433
Actual results:
tstclnt: authentication of server cert failed: SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE: Certificate key usage inadequate for attempted operation.
Expected results:
Connection established
Additional info:
When run with option -o, the tool prints:
Bad server certificate: -8102, Certificate key usage inadequate for attempted operation.
subject DN: CN=localhost
issuer DN: O=Example CA
0 cache hits; 1 cache misses, 0 cache not reusable
0 stateless resumes
Received 0 Cert Status items (OCSP stapled data)
Comment 4Kai Engert (:kaie) (inactive account)
2017-07-28 13:24:34 UTC
Supporting RSA-PSS keys/certificates doesn't seem to be a blocker for deploying initial support for TLS 1.3, because RSA-PSS is just one of several mechanisms supported by TLS 1.3, and isn't widely deployed yet.
in 3.34 it seems like tstclnt does support rsa-pss keys presented by server and can sign Certificate Verify using rsa-pss key
server-side support doesn't work - if server has only rsa-pss certificate, it rejects all connections with handshake_failure
While the basic case works correctly, we have strong suspicion that certificate verification does not cross check the RSA-PSS parameters of a CA certificate with signatures it made, so this bug is not considered fully resolved.
Comment 11Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
2018-10-05 13:06:27 UTC
Hubert could you provide more info on why is this important for 7.7?
it's not super-important (though use of RSA-PSS key is a best way to ensure that it is not vulnerable to Bleichenbacher and DROWN)
that being said, it will be fixed next time we rebase NSS
This issue was not selected to be included either in Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7.7 because it is seen either as low or moderate impact to a small amount of use-cases. The next release will be in Maintenance Support 1 Phase, which means that qualified Critical and Important Security errata advisories (RHSAs) and Urgent Priority Bug Fix errata advisories (RHBAs) may be released as they become available. We will now close this issue, but if you believe that it qualifies for the Maintenance Support 1 Phase, please re-open; otherwise we recommend moving the request to Red Hat Enterprise Linux 8 if applicable.
Since the problem described in this bug report should be
resolved in a recent advisory, it has been closed with a
resolution of ERRATA.
For information on the advisory, and where to find the updated
files, follow the link below.
If the solution does not work for you, open a new bug report.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2019:2237
Created attachment 1262017 [details] ca and server certificates Description of problem: When server signs Server Key Exchange message using RSA-PSS key, the NSS client rejects it as having inadequate key usage Version-Release number of selected component (if applicable): nss-3.28.3-3.el7.x86_64 How reproducible: always Steps to Reproduce: 1. Setup server with attached server/key.pem and server/cert.pem 2. Create nssdb with ca/cert.pem certificate marked as trusted 3. tstclnt -d sql:./nssdb/ -h 127.0.0.1 -p 4433 Actual results: tstclnt: authentication of server cert failed: SEC_ERROR_INADEQUATE_KEY_USAGE: Certificate key usage inadequate for attempted operation. Expected results: Connection established Additional info: When run with option -o, the tool prints: Bad server certificate: -8102, Certificate key usage inadequate for attempted operation. subject DN: CN=localhost issuer DN: O=Example CA 0 cache hits; 1 cache misses, 0 cache not reusable 0 stateless resumes Received 0 Cert Status items (OCSP stapled data)