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Created attachment 1298133[details]
Triggered by "./exiv2 $POC"
Description of problem:
There is a heap-buffer-overflow in Exiv2::Image::printIFDStructure of image.cpp in exiv2.
Version-Release number of selected component (if applicable):
<= latest version
How reproducible:
./exiv2 $POC
Steps to Reproduce:
The output information is as follows:
$./exiv2 POC5
*** Error in `/home/icy/real/exiv2/bin/.libs/lt-exiv2': free(): invalid next size (fast): 0x00000000015597b0 ***
Aborted
GDB debugging information is as follows:
(gdb) set args POC5
(gdb) r
...
Breakpoint 5, Exiv2::Image::printIFDStructure (this=<optimized out>, io=..., out=..., option=Exiv2::kpsRecursive,
start=0, bSwap=<optimized out>, c=<optimized out>, depth=0) at image.cpp:404
404 std::memcpy(buf.pData_,dir.pData_+8,4); // copy dir[8:11] into buffer (short strings)
(gdb) bt
#0 Exiv2::Image::printIFDStructure (this=<optimized out>, io=..., out=..., option=Exiv2::kpsRecursive, start=0,
bSwap=<optimized out>, c=<optimized out>, depth=0) at image.cpp:404
#1 0x00007ffff70b90e1 in Exiv2::Image::printTiffStructure (this=0x61300000de80, io=..., out=...,
option=Exiv2::kpsRecursive, depth=-1, offset=<optimized out>) at image.cpp:518
#2 0x00007ffff71972ac in Exiv2::OrfImage::printStructure (this=<optimized out>, out=..., option=<optimized out>,
depth=<optimized out>) at orfimage.cpp:104
#3 0x00007ffff7198631 in Exiv2::OrfImage::readMetadata (this=<optimized out>) at orfimage.cpp:123
#4 0x0000000000518d8c in Action::Print::printSummary (this=<optimized out>) at actions.cpp:289
#5 0x0000000000518489 in Action::Print::run (this=0x60400000d950, path=...) at actions.cpp:244
#6 0x00000000004e2ebc in main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at exiv2.cpp:170
(gdb) s
=================================================================
==46719==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60200000ed93 at pc 0x7ffff70b7adb bp 0x7fffffffbe10 sp 0x7fffffffbe08
WRITE of size 4 at 0x60200000ed93 thread T0
#0 0x7ffff70b7ada (/home/icy/real/exiv2-asan/install/lib/libexiv2.so.26+0x43bada)
#1 0x7ffff70b90e0 (/home/icy/real/exiv2-asan/install/lib/libexiv2.so.26+0x43d0e0)
#2 0x7ffff71972ab (/home/icy/real/exiv2-asan/install/lib/libexiv2.so.26+0x51b2ab)
#3 0x7ffff7198630 (/home/icy/real/exiv2-asan/install/lib/libexiv2.so.26+0x51c630)
#4 0x518d8b (/home/icy/real/exiv2-asan/install/bin/exiv2+0x518d8b)
#5 0x518488 (/home/icy/real/exiv2-asan/install/bin/exiv2+0x518488)
#6 0x4e2ebb (/home/icy/real/exiv2-asan/install/bin/exiv2+0x4e2ebb)
#7 0x7ffff5e29abf (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x20abf)
#8 0x43b288 (/home/icy/real/exiv2-asan/install/bin/exiv2+0x43b288)
0x60200000ed93 is located 2 bytes to the right of 1-byte region [0x60200000ed90,0x60200000ed91)
allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0x4e1842 (/home/icy/real/exiv2-asan/install/bin/exiv2+0x4e1842)
#1 0x7ffff70b0c5f (/home/icy/real/exiv2-asan/install/lib/libexiv2.so.26+0x434c5f)
#2 0x7ffff70b90e0 (/home/icy/real/exiv2-asan/install/lib/libexiv2.so.26+0x43d0e0)
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x0c047fff9d60: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c047fff9d70: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c047fff9d80: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c047fff9d90: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0c047fff9da0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
=>0x0c047fff9db0: fa fa[01]fa fa fa 00 fa fa fa 00 fa fa fa 00 fa
0x0c047fff9dc0: fa fa 06 fa fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04
0x0c047fff9dd0: fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04
0x0c047fff9de0: fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04
0x0c047fff9df0: fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04 fa fa fd fa
0x0c047fff9e00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Heap right redzone: fb
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone: f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack partial redzone: f4
Stack after return: f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone: f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user: f7
Container overflow: fc
Array cookie: ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
==46719==ABORTING
[Inferior 1 (process 46719) exited with code 01]
This vulnerability was triggered in Exiv2::Image::printIFDStructure () at image.cpp:404.
338 void Image::printIFDStructure(BasicIo& io, std::ostream& out, Exiv2::PrintStructureOption option,uint32_t start,bool bSwap,char c,int depth)
{
...
399 : 1
400 ;
401
402 // if ( offset > io.size() ) offset = 0; // Denial of service?
403 DataBuf buf(size*count + pad+20); // allocate a buffer
404 std::memcpy(buf.pData_,dir.pData_+8,4); // copy dir[8:11] into buffer (short strings)
405 if ( count*size > 4 ) { // read into buffer
406 size_t restore = io.tell(); // save
407 io.seek(offset,BasicIo::beg); // position
408 io.read(buf.pData_,count*size);// read
...
}
Actual results:
crash
Expected results:
crash
Additional info:
This vulnerability is detected by team OWL337, with our custom fuzzer collAFL. Please contact ganshuitao and chaoz.cn if you need more info about the team, the tool or the vulnerability.
Since the problem described in this bug report should be
resolved in a recent advisory, it has been closed with a
resolution of ERRATA.
For information on the advisory, and where to find the updated
files, follow the link below.
If the solution does not work for you, open a new bug report.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2019:2101
Created attachment 1298133 [details] Triggered by "./exiv2 $POC" Description of problem: There is a heap-buffer-overflow in Exiv2::Image::printIFDStructure of image.cpp in exiv2. Version-Release number of selected component (if applicable): <= latest version How reproducible: ./exiv2 $POC Steps to Reproduce: The output information is as follows: $./exiv2 POC5 *** Error in `/home/icy/real/exiv2/bin/.libs/lt-exiv2': free(): invalid next size (fast): 0x00000000015597b0 *** Aborted GDB debugging information is as follows: (gdb) set args POC5 (gdb) r ... Breakpoint 5, Exiv2::Image::printIFDStructure (this=<optimized out>, io=..., out=..., option=Exiv2::kpsRecursive, start=0, bSwap=<optimized out>, c=<optimized out>, depth=0) at image.cpp:404 404 std::memcpy(buf.pData_,dir.pData_+8,4); // copy dir[8:11] into buffer (short strings) (gdb) bt #0 Exiv2::Image::printIFDStructure (this=<optimized out>, io=..., out=..., option=Exiv2::kpsRecursive, start=0, bSwap=<optimized out>, c=<optimized out>, depth=0) at image.cpp:404 #1 0x00007ffff70b90e1 in Exiv2::Image::printTiffStructure (this=0x61300000de80, io=..., out=..., option=Exiv2::kpsRecursive, depth=-1, offset=<optimized out>) at image.cpp:518 #2 0x00007ffff71972ac in Exiv2::OrfImage::printStructure (this=<optimized out>, out=..., option=<optimized out>, depth=<optimized out>) at orfimage.cpp:104 #3 0x00007ffff7198631 in Exiv2::OrfImage::readMetadata (this=<optimized out>) at orfimage.cpp:123 #4 0x0000000000518d8c in Action::Print::printSummary (this=<optimized out>) at actions.cpp:289 #5 0x0000000000518489 in Action::Print::run (this=0x60400000d950, path=...) at actions.cpp:244 #6 0x00000000004e2ebc in main (argc=<optimized out>, argv=<optimized out>) at exiv2.cpp:170 (gdb) s ================================================================= ==46719==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x60200000ed93 at pc 0x7ffff70b7adb bp 0x7fffffffbe10 sp 0x7fffffffbe08 WRITE of size 4 at 0x60200000ed93 thread T0 #0 0x7ffff70b7ada (/home/icy/real/exiv2-asan/install/lib/libexiv2.so.26+0x43bada) #1 0x7ffff70b90e0 (/home/icy/real/exiv2-asan/install/lib/libexiv2.so.26+0x43d0e0) #2 0x7ffff71972ab (/home/icy/real/exiv2-asan/install/lib/libexiv2.so.26+0x51b2ab) #3 0x7ffff7198630 (/home/icy/real/exiv2-asan/install/lib/libexiv2.so.26+0x51c630) #4 0x518d8b (/home/icy/real/exiv2-asan/install/bin/exiv2+0x518d8b) #5 0x518488 (/home/icy/real/exiv2-asan/install/bin/exiv2+0x518488) #6 0x4e2ebb (/home/icy/real/exiv2-asan/install/bin/exiv2+0x4e2ebb) #7 0x7ffff5e29abf (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x20abf) #8 0x43b288 (/home/icy/real/exiv2-asan/install/bin/exiv2+0x43b288) 0x60200000ed93 is located 2 bytes to the right of 1-byte region [0x60200000ed90,0x60200000ed91) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x4e1842 (/home/icy/real/exiv2-asan/install/bin/exiv2+0x4e1842) #1 0x7ffff70b0c5f (/home/icy/real/exiv2-asan/install/lib/libexiv2.so.26+0x434c5f) #2 0x7ffff70b90e0 (/home/icy/real/exiv2-asan/install/lib/libexiv2.so.26+0x43d0e0) Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0c047fff9d60: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff9d70: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff9d80: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff9d90: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0c047fff9da0: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa =>0x0c047fff9db0: fa fa[01]fa fa fa 00 fa fa fa 00 fa fa fa 00 fa 0x0c047fff9dc0: fa fa 06 fa fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04 0x0c047fff9dd0: fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04 0x0c047fff9de0: fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04 0x0c047fff9df0: fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04 fa fa 00 04 fa fa fd fa 0x0c047fff9e00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Heap right redzone: fb Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack partial redzone: f4 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==46719==ABORTING [Inferior 1 (process 46719) exited with code 01] This vulnerability was triggered in Exiv2::Image::printIFDStructure () at image.cpp:404. 338 void Image::printIFDStructure(BasicIo& io, std::ostream& out, Exiv2::PrintStructureOption option,uint32_t start,bool bSwap,char c,int depth) { ... 399 : 1 400 ; 401 402 // if ( offset > io.size() ) offset = 0; // Denial of service? 403 DataBuf buf(size*count + pad+20); // allocate a buffer 404 std::memcpy(buf.pData_,dir.pData_+8,4); // copy dir[8:11] into buffer (short strings) 405 if ( count*size > 4 ) { // read into buffer 406 size_t restore = io.tell(); // save 407 io.seek(offset,BasicIo::beg); // position 408 io.read(buf.pData_,count*size);// read ... } Actual results: crash Expected results: crash Additional info: This vulnerability is detected by team OWL337, with our custom fuzzer collAFL. Please contact ganshuitao and chaoz.cn if you need more info about the team, the tool or the vulnerability.