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> ipa user-mod user1 --user-auth-type=otp
> ssh user1@ipaclient
First Factor: <password+otp>
Second Factor: <empty>
Authenticated!
> ipa user-mod user1 --user-auth-type=otp --user-auth-type=password
> ssh user1@ipaclient
First Factor: <password+otp>
Second Factor (optional): <empty>
Failed!
> ssh user1@ipaclient
First Factor: <password>
Second Factor (optional): <otp>
Authenticated!
I expected <password+otp> should also work when Second Factor is optional.
This is currently expected behavior. The reason is that the Kerberos KDC expects 1FA (password) and 2FA (password+otp) in different formats. It would of course be possible for SSSD to try the other format if the first fails, but this will still cause authentication error on the server side which might e.g. lead to a lock of the password or the account.
But we have plans to allow more flexibility here which is tracked by https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1402056. So I close this ticket as duplicate and I'd like to ask you if you have further comments to add them to ticket #1402056.
*** This bug has been marked as a duplicate of bug 1402056 ***