MIMEDefang 2.80 and earlier creates a PID file after dropping privileges to a non-root account, which might allow local users to kill arbitrary processes by leveraging access to this non-root account for PID file modification before a root script executes a "kill `cat /pathname`" command, as demonstrated by the init-script.in and mimedefang-init.in scripts. Bug report: http://lists.roaringpenguin.com/pipermail/mimedefang/2017-August/038077.html Proposed patch: http://lists.roaringpenguin.com/pipermail/mimedefang/2017-August/038085.html
Created mimedefang tracking bugs for this issue: Affects: epel-all [bug 1487544] Affects: fedora-all [bug 1487545]
Adam, would it be okay to move the PID files to /var/run while keeping the lock files in /var/spool/MIMEDefang further on?
That's how it is now: https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/mimedefang/blob/92a41edb3d089fead60cbe2469a0fcd76136b8d3/f/mimedefang-wrapper
(In reply to Robert Scheck from comment #2) > Adam, would it be okay to move the PID files to /var/run while keeping the > lock files in /var/spool/MIMEDefang further on? Yes, that seems to be more suitable place for pid files.
This CVE Bugzilla entry is for community support informational purposes only as it does not affect a package in a commercially supported Red Hat product. Refer to the dependent bugs for status of those individual community products.