Using custom domains, it is possible to arrange things so that example.com/pkg1 points to a Subversion repository but example.com/pkg1/pkg2 points to a Git repository. If the Subversion repository includes a Git checkout in its pkg2 directory and some other work is done to ensure the proper ordering of operations, “go get” can be tricked into reusing this Git checkout for the fetch of code from pkg2. If the Subversion repository’s Git checkout has a malicious code in .git/hooks/, it will execute on the system running “go get.” Upstream bug: https://github.com/golang/go/issues/22125 Upstream patches: Go 1.8: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/68190 Go 1.9: https://go-review.googlesource.com/c/go/+/68022
Created golang tracking bugs for this issue: Affects: epel-6 [bug 1498872] Affects: fedora-all [bug 1498873]
github issue was updated to include CVE-2017-15041
This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat Developer Tools Via RHSA-2017:3463 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2017:3463
This issue has been addressed in the following products: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7 Via RHSA-2018:0878 https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:0878