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Upstream replies about this issue on vim_dev mailing list: "This is working as intended, Vim does not use umask this way. Umask is only used by simple commands such as cp, not by long running processes that deal with many files. Problem is with the user expectations." IMHO it is correct behavior - when I take Kurt example from http://www.openwall.com/lists/oss-security/2017/10/31/15 , IMO it makes no sense for swp file to have any permissions or have other permissions then 'read' for 'group' and 'other'. Because only user, which opened file, should have access to write into swp file (that means to write into actual file) - 'read' permission is set for other users/groups, so they can open actual file readonly (if they had 'write' permission, collisions and inconsistencies will be made). If this readonly access can be consider as risk, solution which came to mind is (I wrote upstream about it) to have a way how to set file permissions for swap files. If this feature won't meet upstream expectation, I'll close this issue as WONTFIX, because its fixing will diverge from upstream functionality.
Upstream created patch 1263, which changes group of swap. They will not fix umask issue, because it is not applicable to complex apps like VIm.