Note: This bug is displayed in read-only format because
the product is no longer active in Red Hat Bugzilla.
RHEL Engineering is moving the tracking of its product development work on RHEL 6 through RHEL 9 to Red Hat Jira (issues.redhat.com). If you're a Red Hat customer, please continue to file support cases via the Red Hat customer portal. If you're not, please head to the "RHEL project" in Red Hat Jira and file new tickets here. Individual Bugzilla bugs in the statuses "NEW", "ASSIGNED", and "POST" are being migrated throughout September 2023. Bugs of Red Hat partners with an assigned Engineering Partner Manager (EPM) are migrated in late September as per pre-agreed dates. Bugs against components "kernel", "kernel-rt", and "kpatch" are only migrated if still in "NEW" or "ASSIGNED". If you cannot log in to RH Jira, please consult article #7032570. That failing, please send an e-mail to the RH Jira admins at rh-issues@redhat.com to troubleshoot your issue as a user management inquiry. The email creates a ServiceNow ticket with Red Hat. Individual Bugzilla bugs that are migrated will be moved to status "CLOSED", resolution "MIGRATED", and set with "MigratedToJIRA" in "Keywords". The link to the successor Jira issue will be found under "Links", have a little "two-footprint" icon next to it, and direct you to the "RHEL project" in Red Hat Jira (issue links are of type "https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-XXXX", where "X" is a digit). This same link will be available in a blue banner at the top of the page informing you that that bug has been migrated.
Created attachment 1431033[details]
POC
Description of problem:
Heap Buffer Overflow in ft_font_face_hash of gxps-fonts.c
Version-Release number of selected component (if applicable):
<= 0.3.0
How reproducible:
$ ./xpstojpeg POC.xps /dev/null
ASAN output information:
=================================================================
==27116==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ff8d7f45fc4 at pc 0x5565d0bf1b6c bp 0x7fffc5647710 sp 0x7fffc5647700
READ of size 1 at 0x7ff8d7f45fc4 thread T0
#0 0x5565d0bf1b6b in ft_font_face_hash /home/v-fuzz/libgxps-0.2.5/libgxps/gxps-fonts.c:88
#1 0x7ff8e2820883 in g_hash_table_lookup (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x3a883)
#2 0x5565d0bf2994 in gxps_fonts_new_font_face /home/v-fuzz/libgxps-0.2.5/libgxps/gxps-fonts.c:243
#3 0x5565d0bf2d8c in gxps_fonts_get_font /home/v-fuzz/libgxps-0.2.5/libgxps/gxps-fonts.c:298
#4 0x5565d0bcfd89 in render_end_element /home/v-fuzz/libgxps-0.2.5/libgxps/gxps-page.c:841
#5 0x5565d0bcb001 in canvas_end_element /home/v-fuzz/libgxps-0.2.5/libgxps/gxps-page.c:363
#6 0x7ff8e28357d1 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x4f7d1)
#7 0x7ff8e2836721 in g_markup_parse_context_parse (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x50721)
#8 0x5565d0bd7dcb in gxps_parse_stream /home/v-fuzz/libgxps-0.2.5/libgxps/gxps-parse-utils.c:184
#9 0x5565d0bd11a6 in gxps_page_parse_for_rendering /home/v-fuzz/libgxps-0.2.5/libgxps/gxps-page.c:992
#10 0x5565d0bd63f1 in gxps_page_render /home/v-fuzz/libgxps-0.2.5/libgxps/gxps-page.c:1694
#11 0x5565d0bbf225 in gxps_converter_run /home/v-fuzz/libgxps-0.2.5/tools/gxps-converter.c:322
#12 0x5565d0bbb192 in main /home/v-fuzz/libgxps-0.2.5/tools/gxps-converter-main.c:42
#13 0x7ff8e0f24b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96)
#14 0x5565d0bbb029 in _start (/home/v-fuzz/libgxps-0.2.5/tools/xpstopng+0x14029)
0x7ff8d7f45fc4 is located 0 bytes to the right of 186308-byte region [0x7ff8d7f18800,0x7ff8d7f45fc4)
allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 0x7ff8e3480b50 in __interceptor_malloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xdeb50)
#1 0x7ff8e2837858 in g_malloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x51858)
#2 0x5565d0bf288a in gxps_fonts_new_font_face /home/v-fuzz/libgxps-0.2.5/libgxps/gxps-fonts.c:227
#3 0x5565d0bf2d8c in gxps_fonts_get_font /home/v-fuzz/libgxps-0.2.5/libgxps/gxps-fonts.c:298
#4 0x5565d0bcfd89 in render_end_element /home/v-fuzz/libgxps-0.2.5/libgxps/gxps-page.c:841
#5 0x5565d0bcb001 in canvas_end_element /home/v-fuzz/libgxps-0.2.5/libgxps/gxps-page.c:363
#6 0x7ff8e28357d1 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x4f7d1)
#7 0x61d0000139bf (<unknown module>)
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /home/v-fuzz/libgxps-0.2.5/libgxps/gxps-fonts.c:88 in ft_font_face_hash
Shadow bytes around the buggy address:
0x0fff9afe0ba0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0fff9afe0bb0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0fff9afe0bc0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0fff9afe0bd0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
0x0fff9afe0be0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
=>0x0fff9afe0bf0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[04]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0fff9afe0c00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0fff9afe0c10: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0fff9afe0c20: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0fff9afe0c30: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
0x0fff9afe0c40: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa
Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes):
Addressable: 00
Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07
Heap left redzone: fa
Freed heap region: fd
Stack left redzone: f1
Stack mid redzone: f2
Stack right redzone: f3
Stack after return: f5
Stack use after scope: f8
Global redzone: f9
Global init order: f6
Poisoned by user: f7
Container overflow: fc
Array cookie: ac
Intra object redzone: bb
ASan internal: fe
Left alloca redzone: ca
Right alloca redzone: cb
==27116==ABORTING
This vulnerability was triggered in ft_font_face_hash() at libgxps/gxps-fonts.c:88
79 static guint
80 ft_font_face_hash (gconstpointer v)
81 {
82 FtFontFace *ft_face = (FtFontFace *)v;
83 guchar *bytes = ft_face->font_data;
84 gssize len = ft_face->font_data_len;
85 guint hash = 5381;
86
87 while (len--) {
88 guchar c = *bytes++;
89
90 hash *= 33;
91 hash ^= c;
92 }
93
94 return hash;
95 }
Actual results:
crash
Expected results:
crash
Additional info:
This vulnerability is detected by NESA Lab(nesa.zju.edu.cn), with our custom fuzzer v-fuzz. Please contact liyuwei23 and chenyuan.cn if you need more info about the team, the tool or the vulnerability.
Comment 2Salvatore Bonaccorso
2018-05-05 06:28:27 UTC
Has this issue been reported upstream?
Comment 3Salvatore Bonaccorso
2018-05-05 06:29:00 UTC
Since the problem described in this bug report should be
resolved in a recent advisory, it has been closed with a
resolution of ERRATA.
For information on the advisory, and where to find the updated
files, follow the link below.
If the solution does not work for you, open a new bug report.
https://access.redhat.com/errata/RHSA-2018:3140
Created attachment 1431033 [details] POC Description of problem: Heap Buffer Overflow in ft_font_face_hash of gxps-fonts.c Version-Release number of selected component (if applicable): <= 0.3.0 How reproducible: $ ./xpstojpeg POC.xps /dev/null ASAN output information: ================================================================= ==27116==ERROR: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow on address 0x7ff8d7f45fc4 at pc 0x5565d0bf1b6c bp 0x7fffc5647710 sp 0x7fffc5647700 READ of size 1 at 0x7ff8d7f45fc4 thread T0 #0 0x5565d0bf1b6b in ft_font_face_hash /home/v-fuzz/libgxps-0.2.5/libgxps/gxps-fonts.c:88 #1 0x7ff8e2820883 in g_hash_table_lookup (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x3a883) #2 0x5565d0bf2994 in gxps_fonts_new_font_face /home/v-fuzz/libgxps-0.2.5/libgxps/gxps-fonts.c:243 #3 0x5565d0bf2d8c in gxps_fonts_get_font /home/v-fuzz/libgxps-0.2.5/libgxps/gxps-fonts.c:298 #4 0x5565d0bcfd89 in render_end_element /home/v-fuzz/libgxps-0.2.5/libgxps/gxps-page.c:841 #5 0x5565d0bcb001 in canvas_end_element /home/v-fuzz/libgxps-0.2.5/libgxps/gxps-page.c:363 #6 0x7ff8e28357d1 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x4f7d1) #7 0x7ff8e2836721 in g_markup_parse_context_parse (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x50721) #8 0x5565d0bd7dcb in gxps_parse_stream /home/v-fuzz/libgxps-0.2.5/libgxps/gxps-parse-utils.c:184 #9 0x5565d0bd11a6 in gxps_page_parse_for_rendering /home/v-fuzz/libgxps-0.2.5/libgxps/gxps-page.c:992 #10 0x5565d0bd63f1 in gxps_page_render /home/v-fuzz/libgxps-0.2.5/libgxps/gxps-page.c:1694 #11 0x5565d0bbf225 in gxps_converter_run /home/v-fuzz/libgxps-0.2.5/tools/gxps-converter.c:322 #12 0x5565d0bbb192 in main /home/v-fuzz/libgxps-0.2.5/tools/gxps-converter-main.c:42 #13 0x7ff8e0f24b96 in __libc_start_main (/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libc.so.6+0x21b96) #14 0x5565d0bbb029 in _start (/home/v-fuzz/libgxps-0.2.5/tools/xpstopng+0x14029) 0x7ff8d7f45fc4 is located 0 bytes to the right of 186308-byte region [0x7ff8d7f18800,0x7ff8d7f45fc4) allocated by thread T0 here: #0 0x7ff8e3480b50 in __interceptor_malloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libasan.so.4+0xdeb50) #1 0x7ff8e2837858 in g_malloc (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x51858) #2 0x5565d0bf288a in gxps_fonts_new_font_face /home/v-fuzz/libgxps-0.2.5/libgxps/gxps-fonts.c:227 #3 0x5565d0bf2d8c in gxps_fonts_get_font /home/v-fuzz/libgxps-0.2.5/libgxps/gxps-fonts.c:298 #4 0x5565d0bcfd89 in render_end_element /home/v-fuzz/libgxps-0.2.5/libgxps/gxps-page.c:841 #5 0x5565d0bcb001 in canvas_end_element /home/v-fuzz/libgxps-0.2.5/libgxps/gxps-page.c:363 #6 0x7ff8e28357d1 (/usr/lib/x86_64-linux-gnu/libglib-2.0.so.0+0x4f7d1) #7 0x61d0000139bf (<unknown module>) SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-buffer-overflow /home/v-fuzz/libgxps-0.2.5/libgxps/gxps-fonts.c:88 in ft_font_face_hash Shadow bytes around the buggy address: 0x0fff9afe0ba0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fff9afe0bb0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fff9afe0bc0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fff9afe0bd0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0x0fff9afe0be0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 =>0x0fff9afe0bf0: 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00[04]fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fff9afe0c00: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fff9afe0c10: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fff9afe0c20: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fff9afe0c30: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa 0x0fff9afe0c40: fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa fa Shadow byte legend (one shadow byte represents 8 application bytes): Addressable: 00 Partially addressable: 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 Heap left redzone: fa Freed heap region: fd Stack left redzone: f1 Stack mid redzone: f2 Stack right redzone: f3 Stack after return: f5 Stack use after scope: f8 Global redzone: f9 Global init order: f6 Poisoned by user: f7 Container overflow: fc Array cookie: ac Intra object redzone: bb ASan internal: fe Left alloca redzone: ca Right alloca redzone: cb ==27116==ABORTING This vulnerability was triggered in ft_font_face_hash() at libgxps/gxps-fonts.c:88 79 static guint 80 ft_font_face_hash (gconstpointer v) 81 { 82 FtFontFace *ft_face = (FtFontFace *)v; 83 guchar *bytes = ft_face->font_data; 84 gssize len = ft_face->font_data_len; 85 guint hash = 5381; 86 87 while (len--) { 88 guchar c = *bytes++; 89 90 hash *= 33; 91 hash ^= c; 92 } 93 94 return hash; 95 } Actual results: crash Expected results: crash Additional info: This vulnerability is detected by NESA Lab(nesa.zju.edu.cn), with our custom fuzzer v-fuzz. Please contact liyuwei23 and chenyuan.cn if you need more info about the team, the tool or the vulnerability.