+++ This bug was initially created as a clone of Bug #1625095 +++ +++ This bug was initially created as a clone of Bug #1625085 +++ This is an automatically created tracking bug! It was created to ensure that one or more security vulnerabilities are fixed in affected versions of fedora-all. For comments that are specific to the vulnerability please use bugs filed against the "Security Response" product referenced in the "Blocks" field. For more information see: http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Security/TrackingBugs When submitting as an update, use the fedpkg template provided in the next comment(s). This will include the bug IDs of this tracking bug as well as the relevant top-level CVE bugs. Please also mention the CVE IDs being fixed in the RPM changelog and the fedpkg commit message. NOTE: this issue affects multiple supported versions of Fedora. While only one tracking bug has been filed, please correct all affected versions at the same time. If you need to fix the versions independent of each other, you may clone this bug as appropriate. --- Additional comment from Siddharth Sharma on 2018-09-04 01:44:38 EDT --- Use the following template to for the 'fedpkg update' request to submit an update for this issue as it contains the top-level parent bug(s) as well as this tracking bug. This will ensure that all associated bugs get updated when new packages are pushed to stable. ===== # bugfix, security, enhancement, newpackage (required) type=security # testing, stable request=testing # Bug numbers: 1234,9876 bugs=1612664,1625085 # Description of your update notes=Security fix for [PUT CVEs HERE] # Enable request automation based on the stable/unstable karma thresholds autokarma=True stable_karma=3 unstable_karma=-3 # Automatically close bugs when this marked as stable close_bugs=True # Suggest that users restart after update suggest_reboot=False ====== Additionally, you may opt to use the bodhi web interface to submit updates: https://bodhi.fedoraproject.org/updates/new --- Additional comment from Worker Ant on 2018-09-04 02:18:37 EDT --- REVIEW: https://review.gluster.org/21068 (server-protocol: don't allow '../' path in 'name') posted (#1) for review on master by Amar Tumballi --- Additional comment from Worker Ant on 2018-09-05 05:24:13 EDT --- COMMIT: https://review.gluster.org/21068 committed in master by "Amar Tumballi" <amarts> with a commit message- server-protocol: don't allow '../' path in 'name' This will prevent any arbitrary file creation through glusterfs by modifying the client bits. Also check for the similar flaw inside posix too, so we prevent any changes in layers in-between. Fixes: bz#1625095 Signed-off-by: Amar Tumballi <amarts> Change-Id: Id9fe0ef6e86459e8ed85ab947d977f058c5ae06e
REVIEW: https://review.gluster.org/21102 (server-protocol: don't allow '../' path in 'name') posted (#1) for review on release-3.12 by Amar Tumballi
COMMIT: https://review.gluster.org/21102 committed in release-3.12 by "jiffin tony Thottan" <jthottan> with a commit message- server-protocol: don't allow '../' path in 'name' This will prevent any arbitrary file creation through glusterfs by modifying the client bits. Also check for the similar flaw inside posix too, so we prevent any changes in layers in-between. BUG: 1625664 Signed-off-by: Amar Tumballi <amarts> Change-Id: Id9fe0ef6e86459e8ed85ab947d977f058c5ae06e
This bug is getting closed because a release has been made available that should address the reported issue. In case the problem is still not fixed with glusterfs-3.12.14, please open a new bug report. glusterfs-3.12.14 has been announced on the Gluster mailinglists [1], packages for several distributions should become available in the near future. Keep an eye on the Gluster Users mailinglist [2] and the update infrastructure for your distribution. [1] https://lists.gluster.org/pipermail/announce/2018-September/000112.html [2] https://www.gluster.org/pipermail/gluster-users/