Bug 1654646 - Segfault in sshd after krb5int_hmac_keyblock
Summary: Segfault in sshd after krb5int_hmac_keyblock
Keywords:
Status: CLOSED DUPLICATE of bug 1645711
Alias: None
Product: Red Hat Enterprise Linux 7
Classification: Red Hat
Component: krb5
Version: 7.6
Hardware: Unspecified
OS: Unspecified
unspecified
high
Target Milestone: rc
: ---
Assignee: Robbie Harwood
QA Contact: BaseOS QE Security Team
URL:
Whiteboard:
Depends On:
Blocks:
TreeView+ depends on / blocked
 
Reported: 2018-11-29 10:33 UTC by Welterlen Benoit
Modified: 2018-12-06 17:33 UTC (History)
6 users (show)

Fixed In Version:
Doc Type: If docs needed, set a value
Doc Text:
Clone Of:
Environment:
Last Closed: 2018-12-06 17:33:22 UTC
Target Upstream Version:


Attachments (Terms of Use)

Description Welterlen Benoit 2018-11-29 10:33:31 UTC
Description of problem:
The customer gets segfaults in sshd:
Nov 19 09:56:59 $SERVERNAME kernel: sshd[26319]: segfault at 0 ip           (null) sp 00007fffc8f705b8 error 14 in sshd[559746ef1000+c8000]

The backtrace is reporting krb:


Core was generated by `sshd: host [priv]'.
Program terminated with signal 11, Segmentation fault.
#0  0x0000000000000000 in ?? ()
(gdb) bt
#0  0x0000000000000000 in ?? ()
#1  0x00007fdf02799969 in krb5int_hmac_keyblock (hash=hash@entry=0x7fdf0299eda0 <krb5int_hash_md5>, keyblock=keyblock@entry=0x559ed62428f0, data=data@entry=0x7ffca80ea7d0, num_data=num_data@entry=1, output=output@entry=0x7ffca80ea7c0)
    at hmac.c:145
#2  0x00007fdf02794518 in usage_key (hash=hash@entry=0x7fdf0299eda0 <krb5int_hash_md5>, session_keyblock=session_keyblock@entry=0x559ed62428f0, usage=usage@entry=2, out=<optimized out>, out=<optimized out>, enc=<optimized out>)
    at enc_rc4.c:64
#3  0x00007fdf02794ae4 in krb5int_arcfour_decrypt (ktp=<optimized out>, key=0x559ed62428f0, usage=2, ivec=0x0, data=0x7ffca80ea920, num_data=4) at enc_rc4.c:260
#4  0x00007fdf02790b1b in krb5_k_decrypt (context=context@entry=0x559ed623bd80, key=0x559ed62428f0, usage=usage@entry=2, cipher_state=cipher_state@entry=0x0, input=input@entry=0x559ed623c4f0, output=output@entry=0x7ffca80eaa20)
    at decrypt.c:78
#5  0x00007fdf02790bed in krb5_c_decrypt (context=context@entry=0x559ed623bd80, keyblock=keyblock@entry=0x7ffca80eab98, usage=2, cipher_state=cipher_state@entry=0x0, input=input@entry=0x559ed623c4f0, output=output@entry=0x7ffca80eaa20)
    at decrypt.c:98
#6  0x00007fdf029ea115 in krb5_decrypt_tkt_part (context=context@entry=0x559ed623bd80, srv_key=srv_key@entry=0x7ffca80eab98, ticket=0x559ed623c4e0) at decrypt_tk.c:56
#7  0x00007fdf02a07350 in try_one_entry (context=context@entry=0x559ed623bd80, ent=ent@entry=0x7ffca80eab80, keyblock_out=keyblock_out@entry=0x7ffca80eab40, req=<optimized out>) at rd_req_dec.c:296
#8  0x00007fdf02a07c76 in decrypt_ticket (keyblock_out=0x7ffca80eab40, keytab=0x559ed623c8d0, server=0x559ed6242820, req=0x559ed623c4a0, context=0x559ed623bd80) at rd_req_dec.c:423
#9  rd_req_decoded_opt (context=0x559ed623bd80, auth_context=auth_context@entry=0x7ffca80ead88, req=0x559ed623c4a0, server=0x559ed6242820, keytab=0x559ed623c8d0, ap_req_options=ap_req_options@entry=0x7ffca80ead50, 
    ticket=ticket@entry=0x0, check_valid_flag=check_valid_flag@entry=1) at rd_req_dec.c:504
#10 0x00007fdf02a088ca in krb5_rd_req_decoded (context=<optimized out>, auth_context=auth_context@entry=0x7ffca80ead88, req=<optimized out>, server=<optimized out>, keytab=<optimized out>, 
    ap_req_options=ap_req_options@entry=0x7ffca80ead50, ticket=ticket@entry=0x0) at rd_req_dec.c:808
#11 0x00007fdf02caa35c in kg_accept_krb5 (minor_status=minor_status@entry=0x559ed6228004, context_handle=context_handle@entry=0x559ed6227ff0, verifier_cred_handle=0x559ed623c740, input_token=<optimized out>, input_chan_bindings=0x0, 
    src_name=0x7ffca80eb1b8, mech_type=mech_type@entry=0x7ffca80eb1c8, output_token=output_token@entry=0x7ffca80eb2c0, ret_flags=ret_flags@entry=0x7ffca80eb1a4, time_rec=time_rec@entry=0x0, 
    delegated_cred_handle=delegated_cred_handle@entry=0x7ffca80eb1b0, exts=exts@entry=0x7ffca80eb100) at accept_sec_context.c:644
#12 0x00007fdf02cab83a in krb5_gss_accept_sec_context_ext (minor_status=0x559ed6228004, context_handle=0x559ed6227ff0, verifier_cred_handle=<optimized out>, input_token=<optimized out>, input_chan_bindings=<optimized out>, 
    src_name=<optimized out>, mech_type=mech_type@entry=0x7ffca80eb1c8, output_token=output_token@entry=0x7ffca80eb2c0, ret_flags=ret_flags@entry=0x7ffca80eb1a4, time_rec=time_rec@entry=0x0, 
    delegated_cred_handle=delegated_cred_handle@entry=0x7ffca80eb1b0, exts=exts@entry=0x7ffca80eb100) at accept_sec_context.c:1308
#13 0x00007fdf02cab999 in krb5_gss_accept_sec_context (minor_status=<optimized out>, context_handle=<optimized out>, verifier_cred_handle=<optimized out>, input_token=<optimized out>, input_chan_bindings=<optimized out>, 
    src_name=<optimized out>, mech_type=0x7ffca80eb1c8, output_token=0x7ffca80eb2c0, ret_flags=0x7ffca80eb1a4, time_rec=0x0, delegated_cred_handle=0x7ffca80eb1b0) at accept_sec_context.c:1337
#14 0x00007fdf02c99056 in gss_accept_sec_context (minor_status=minor_status@entry=0x559ed6228004, context_handle=context_handle@entry=0x559ed6228008, verifier_cred_handle=<optimized out>, 
    input_token_buffer=input_token_buffer@entry=0x7ffca80eb2b0, input_chan_bindings=input_chan_bindings@entry=0x0, src_name=src_name@entry=0x559ed6228028, mech_type=mech_type@entry=0x7ffca80eb270, 
    output_token=output_token@entry=0x7ffca80eb2c0, ret_flags=ret_flags@entry=0x7ffca80eb2a8, time_rec=time_rec@entry=0x0, d_cred=d_cred@entry=0x559ed6228030) at g_accept_sec_context.c:267
#15 0x0000559ed495c3a4 in ssh_gssapi_accept_ctx (ctx=0x559ed6228000, recv_tok=recv_tok@entry=0x7ffca80eb2b0, send_tok=send_tok@entry=0x7ffca80eb2c0, flags=flags@entry=0x7ffca80eb2a8) at gss-serv.c:209
#16 0x0000559ed4955fd8 in mm_answer_gss_accept_ctx (sock=7, m=0x7ffca80eb320) at monitor.c:1899
#17 0x0000559ed4957299 in monitor_read (pmonitor=pmonitor@entry=0x559ed62274d0, ent=0x559ed4bf8390 <mon_dispatch_proto20+336>, pent=pent@entry=0x7ffca80eb3c8) at monitor.c:566
#18 0x0000559ed4957a0c in monitor_child_preauth (_authctxt=_authctxt@entry=0x559ed6223560, pmonitor=0x559ed62274d0) at monitor.c:349
#19 0x0000559ed493c1f4 in privsep_preauth (authctxt=0x559ed6223560) at sshd.c:667
#20 main (ac=<optimized out>, av=<optimized out>) at sshd.c:2179


Version-Release number of selected component (if applicable):
-RHEL 7.6  - openssh-server-7.4p1-16.el7.x86_64
-Was working previously with RHEL 7.5.
-FIPS is enabled
-a 3rd party library is linked (One Idendity vas), but not in the bt

How reproducible:
always (on customer site)

Steps to Reproduce:
1. 
2.
3.

Actual results:
sshd segfault

Expected results:
no segfault

Additional info:
I tried to analyse the issue in the case:

The issue is after the call of krb5int_hmac_keyblock as we can see in the backtrace:

8<---------- 8< ---------------- 8< ---------------- 8< --------
#0  0x0000000000000000 in ?? ()
#1  0x00007f38bfcca969 in krb5int_hmac_keyblock (hash=hash@entry=0x7f38bfecfda0 <krb5int_hash_md5>, keyblock=keyblock@entry=0x55e406465760, data=data@entry=0x7ffccf074d50, num_data=num_data@entry=1, output=output@entry=0x7ffccf074d40)
    at hmac.c:145
#2  0x00007f38bfcc5518 in usage_key (hash=hash@entry=0x7f38bfecfda0 <krb5int_hash_md5>, session_keyblock=session_keyblock@entry=0x55e406465760, usage=usage@entry=2, out=<optimized out>, out=<optimized out>, enc=<optimized out>)
    at enc_rc4.c:64
#3  0x00007f38bfcc5ae4 in krb5int_arcfour_decrypt (ktp=<optimized out>, key=0x55e406465760, usage=2, ivec=0x0, data=0x7ffccf074ea0, num_data=4) at enc_rc4.c:260
#4  0x00007f38bfcc1b1b in krb5_k_decrypt (context=context@entry=0x55e40645ddf0, key=0x55e406465760, usage=usage@entry=2, cipher_state=cipher_state@entry=0x0, input=input@entry=0x55e40645e540, output=output@entry=0x7ffccf074fa0)
    at decrypt.c:78
#5  0x00007f38bfcc1bed in krb5_c_decrypt (context=context@entry=0x55e40645ddf0, keyblock=keyblock@entry=0x7ffccf075118, usage=2, cipher_state=cipher_state@entry=0x0, input=input@entry=0x55e40645e540, output=output@entry=0x7ffccf074fa0)
    at decrypt.c:98
8<---------- 8< ---------------- 8< ---------------- 8< --------

More precisely, it is in: HMAC_Update(ctx, (uint8_t *)iov->data.data, iov->data.length);
that calls then

8<---------- 8< ---------------- 8< ---------------- 8< --------
int EVP_DigestUpdate(EVP_MD_CTX *ctx, const void *data, size_t count)
{
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
    FIPS_selftest_check();
#endif
    return ctx->update(ctx, data, count);
}
8<---------- 8< ---------------- 8< ---------------- 8< --------

- If we look in details (and in asm):

8<---------- 8< ---------------- 8< ---------------- 8< --------
(gdb) disassemble /m HMAC_Update
Dump of assembler code for function HMAC_Update:
167     {

168         if (!ctx->md)
   0x00007f38c136df80 <+0>:     cmpq   $0x0,(%rdi)
   0x00007f38c136df84 <+4>:     je     0x7f38c136df90 <HMAC_Update+16>

169             return 0;
170
171         return EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->md_ctx, data, len);
   0x00007f38c136df86 <+6>:     add    $0x8,%rdi
   0x00007f38c136df8a <+10>:    jmpq   0x7f38c1403060 <EVP_DigestUpdate>
   0x00007f38c136df8f <+15>:    nop

172     }
   0x00007f38c136df90 <+16>:    xor    %eax,%eax
   0x00007f38c136df92 <+18>:    retq  
   0x00007f38c136df93:  nopl   (%rax)
   0x00007f38c136df96:  nopw   %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1)

End of assembler dump.

(gdb) disassemble /m EVP_DigestUpdate
Dump of assembler code for function EVP_DigestUpdate:
292     {
   0x00007f38c1403060 <+0>:     push   %r12
   0x00007f38c1403062 <+2>:     mov    %rdx,%r12
   0x00007f38c1403065 <+5>:     push   %rbp
   0x00007f38c1403066 <+6>:     mov    %rsi,%rbp
   0x00007f38c1403069 <+9>:     push   %rbx
   0x00007f38c140306a <+10>:    mov    %rdi,%rbx

293     #ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
294         FIPS_selftest_check();
   0x00007f38c140306d <+13>:    callq  0x7f38c1477ec0 <FIPS_selftest_check>

295     #endif
296         return ctx->update(ctx, data, count);
   0x00007f38c1403072 <+18>:    mov    0x28(%rbx),%rax
   0x00007f38c1403076 <+22>:    mov    %rbx,%rdi
   0x00007f38c1403079 <+25>:    mov    %rbp,%rsi
   0x00007f38c140307e <+30>:    mov    %r12,%rdx
   0x00007f38c1403083 <+35>:    jmpq   *%rax <<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<<
   0x00007f38c1403085:  nop
   0x00007f38c1403086:  nopw   %cs:0x0(%rax,%rax,1)

297     }
   0x00007f38c140307c <+28>:    pop    %rbx
   0x00007f38c140307d <+29>:    pop    %rbp
   0x00007f38c1403081 <+33>:    pop    %r12

End of assembler dump.
8<---------- 8< ---------------- 8< ---------------- 8< --------

The issue is that the program tries to jump to the address pointed by the register %rax, but this one is null:
- rax            0x0      0

-> This is the reason of the segfault.

- Now, the question is why this value.
This comes from the variable 'HMAC_CTX c' initialized in krb5int_hmac_keyblock:
---
HMAC_CTX_init(&c);
HMAC_Init(&c, keyblock->contents, keyblock->length, map_digest(hash));
---

At this moment, this is the value of ctx:
>  p *ctx
$63 = {md = 0x7f38c1721a80 <md5_md>, md_ctx = {digest = 0x0, engine = 0x0, flags = 0, md_data = 0x0, pctx = 0x0, update = 0x0}, i_ctx = {digest = 0x0, engine = 0x0, flags = 0, md_data = 0x0, pctx = 0x0, update = 0x0}, o_ctx = {
    digest = 0x0, engine = 0x0, flags = 0, md_data = 0x0, pctx = 0x0, update = 0x0}, key_length = 0, key = '\000' <repeats 127 times>}
>> md_ctx is null. And it is md_ctx->update that will be used in EVP_DigestUpdate.

- The return value of  HMAC_CTX_init and HMAC_Init are not checked.
The variable should be correctly initialized in HMAC_Init:

8<---------- 8< ---------------- 8< ---------------- 8< --------
int HMAC_Init(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int len, const EVP_MD *md)
{
    if (key && md)
        HMAC_CTX_init(ctx);
    return HMAC_Init_ex(ctx, key, len, md, NULL);
}
int HMAC_Init_ex(HMAC_CTX *ctx, const void *key, int len,
                 const EVP_MD *md, ENGINE *impl)
{
    int i, j, reset = 0;
    unsigned char pad[HMAC_MAX_MD_CBLOCK];

#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
    /* If FIPS mode switch to approved implementation if possible */
    if (FIPS_mode()) {
        const EVP_MD *fipsmd;
        if (md) {
            fipsmd = FIPS_get_digestbynid(EVP_MD_type(md));
            if (fipsmd)
                md = fipsmd;
        }
    }

    if (FIPS_mode()) {
        /* If we have an ENGINE need to allow non FIPS */
        if ((impl || ctx->i_ctx.engine)
            && !(ctx->i_ctx.flags & EVP_CIPH_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)) {
            EVPerr(EVP_F_HMAC_INIT_EX, EVP_R_DISABLED_FOR_FIPS);
            return 0;
        }
    }
#endif
    /* If we are changing MD then we must have a key */
    if (md != NULL && md != ctx->md && (key == NULL || len < 0))
        return 0;

    if (md != NULL) {
        reset = 1;
        ctx->md = md;
    } else if (ctx->md) {
        md = ctx->md;
    } else {
        return 0;
    }
    if (key != NULL) {
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
        if (FIPS_mode() && !(md->flags & EVP_MD_FLAG_FIPS)
            && (!(ctx->md_ctx.flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)
                || !(ctx->i_ctx.flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)
                || !(ctx->o_ctx.flags & EVP_MD_CTX_FLAG_NON_FIPS_ALLOW)))
            goto err;
#endif
        reset = 1;
        j = EVP_MD_block_size(md);
        OPENSSL_assert(j <= (int)sizeof(ctx->key));
        if (j < len) {
            if (!EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctx->md_ctx, md, impl))
                goto err;
            if (!EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctx->md_ctx, key, len))
                goto err;
            if (!EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&(ctx->md_ctx), ctx->key,
                                    &ctx->key_length))
                goto err;
        } else {

...
8<---------- 8< ---------------- 8< ---------------- 8< --------

We can see that we can exit (goto err: return 0;) without initializing ctx->md_ctx (and in the condition, this variable is used in the case of FIPS use, which is your case).

As the return value of HMAC_Init is not used, the program continues with a partially initialized variable.

Comment 12 Robbie Harwood 2018-12-06 17:33:22 UTC

*** This bug has been marked as a duplicate of bug 1645711 ***


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