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Not sure across what component to file this flaw. But this came via a customer, and seems like we should fix this asap.

As per: https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/7/html/selinux_users_and_administrators_guide/sect-security-enhanced_linux-targeted_policy-confined_and_unconfined_users

Execute in home directory and /tmp (default) -> No

The document further says:

"By default, Linux users in the guest_t and xguest_t domains cannot execute applications in their home directories or the /tmp directory, preventing them from executing applications, which inherit users' permissions, in directories they have write access to. This helps prevent flawed or malicious applications from modifying users' files."

However this is not the case as it can be seen from:

[root@lenovo-rd230-01 ~]# getsebool -a | grep -i "exec_content"
auditadm_exec_content --> on
dbadm_exec_content --> on
guest_exec_content --> on
logadm_exec_content --> on
secadm_exec_content --> on
staff_exec_content --> on
sysadm_exec_content --> on
user_exec_content --> on
xguest_exec_content --> on

Which is also suggested by:
https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/7/html/selinux_users_and_administrators_guide/sect-Security-Enhanced_Linux-Confining_Users-Booleans_for_Users_Executing_Applications

which means either the documentation is wrong or the policy has a bug.

I think the policy has a bug, and  guest_u  and xguest_u should by default not be allowed to execute binaries in their home dirs or /tmp

Same is applicable to rhel-8 as well.

# rpm -qa selinux\*
selinux-policy-targeted-3.13.1-252.el7.noarch
selinux-policy-3.13.1-252.el7.noarch
# getsebool -a | grep exec_content
auditadm_exec_content --> on
dbadm_exec_content --> on
guest_exec_content --> on
logadm_exec_content --> on
secadm_exec_content --> on
staff_exec_content --> on
sysadm_exec_content --> on
user_exec_content --> on
xguest_exec_content --> on
#

The update is available on the Customer Portal:
https://access.redhat.com/documentation/en-us/red_hat_enterprise_linux/7/html-single/selinux_users_and_administrators_guide/sect-security-enhanced_linux-targeted_policy-confined_and_unconfined_users?lb_target=stage#sect-Security-Enhanced_Linux-Targeted_Policy-Confined_and_Unconfined_Users