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The polkit spec file specifies that the /etc/polkit-1/rules.d/ owner is user polkitd, and then polkitd user/process has permission to add new policy files.
%attr(0700,polkitd,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/polkit-1/rules.d
the daemon polkit loads rules from directory /etc/polkit-1/rules.d and /usr/share/polkit-1/rules.d
# systemctl status polkit
● polkit.service - Authorization Manager
Loaded: loaded (/usr/lib/systemd/system/polkit.service; static; vendor preset: enabled)
Active: active (running) since 四 2019-08-29 23:44:47 CST; 3 days ago
Docs: man:polkit(8)
Main PID: 726 (polkitd)
CGroup: /system.slice/polkit.service
└─726 /usr/lib/polkit-1/polkitd --no-debug
8月 29 23:44:45 Fcc systemd[1]: Starting Authorization Manager...
8月 29 23:44:46 Fcc polkitd[726]: Started polkitd version 0.112
8月 29 23:44:47 Fcc polkitd[726]: Loading rules from directory /etc/polkit-1/rules.d
8月 29 23:44:47 Fcc polkitd[726]: Loading rules from directory /usr/share/polkit-1/rules.d
8月 29 23:44:47 Fcc polkitd[726]: Finished loading, compiling and executing 2 rules
8月 29 23:44:47 Fcc polkitd[726]: Acquired the name org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1 on the system bus
8月 29 23:44:47 Fcc systemd[1]: Started Authorization Manager.
polkitd starts with superuser privileges but drops privileges early by switching to the unprivileged polkitd system user.
# ps -elf | grep polkitd
4 S polkitd 726 1 0 80 0 - 135131 poll_s 8月29 ? 00:00:01 /usr/lib/polkit-1/polkitd --no-debug[/i]
If the polkitd program has a vulnerability，it may be exploited to add any rule file，for expamle /etc/polkit-1/rules.d/30_nopasswd_test.rules
[i]polkit.addRule(function(action, subject) {
if (subject.isInGroup("test")) {
return polkit.Result.YES;
}
})
so user in Group test can exec any command without authentication
[test@localhost ~]$ id
uid=1001(test) gid=1001(test) groups=1001(test) context=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
[test@localhost ~]$ pkexec id
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) context=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023
Finally,why not set the permissions to 500，the user polkitd only have read and search permissions
The polkit spec file specifies that the /etc/polkit-1/rules.d/ owner is user polkitd, and then polkitd user/process has permission to add new policy files. %attr(0700,polkitd,root) %dir %{_sysconfdir}/polkit-1/rules.d the daemon polkit loads rules from directory /etc/polkit-1/rules.d and /usr/share/polkit-1/rules.d # systemctl status polkit ● polkit.service - Authorization Manager Loaded: loaded (/usr/lib/systemd/system/polkit.service; static; vendor preset: enabled) Active: active (running) since 四 2019-08-29 23:44:47 CST; 3 days ago Docs: man:polkit(8) Main PID: 726 (polkitd) CGroup: /system.slice/polkit.service └─726 /usr/lib/polkit-1/polkitd --no-debug 8月 29 23:44:45 Fcc systemd[1]: Starting Authorization Manager... 8月 29 23:44:46 Fcc polkitd[726]: Started polkitd version 0.112 8月 29 23:44:47 Fcc polkitd[726]: Loading rules from directory /etc/polkit-1/rules.d 8月 29 23:44:47 Fcc polkitd[726]: Loading rules from directory /usr/share/polkit-1/rules.d 8月 29 23:44:47 Fcc polkitd[726]: Finished loading, compiling and executing 2 rules 8月 29 23:44:47 Fcc polkitd[726]: Acquired the name org.freedesktop.PolicyKit1 on the system bus 8月 29 23:44:47 Fcc systemd[1]: Started Authorization Manager. polkitd starts with superuser privileges but drops privileges early by switching to the unprivileged polkitd system user. # ps -elf | grep polkitd 4 S polkitd 726 1 0 80 0 - 135131 poll_s 8月29 ? 00:00:01 /usr/lib/polkit-1/polkitd --no-debug[/i] If the polkitd program has a vulnerability，it may be exploited to add any rule file，for expamle /etc/polkit-1/rules.d/30_nopasswd_test.rules [i]polkit.addRule(function(action, subject) { if (subject.isInGroup("test")) { return polkit.Result.YES; } }) so user in Group test can exec any command without authentication [test@localhost ~]$ id uid=1001(test) gid=1001(test) groups=1001(test) context=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 [test@localhost ~]$ pkexec id uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) context=unconfined_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:s0-s0:c0.c1023 Finally,why not set the permissions to 500，the user polkitd only have read and search permissions