Bug 1861017

Looking at must gather seeing lots of issues throughout critical operators, this isn't striking me as an mco issue mainly:

```
2020-07-25T20:15:37.601156014Z E0725 20:15:37.601147       1 controller.go:129] {AuthenticationOperator2 AuthenticationOperator2} failed with: Unauthorized
2020-07-25T20:15:37.601186114Z E0725 20:15:37.601169       1 authentication.go:53] Unable to authenticate the request due to an error: [invalid bearer token, Unauthorized]
2020-07-25T20:15:37.601209525Z E0725 20:15:37.601172       1 authentication.go:53] Unable to authenticate the request due to an error: [invalid bearer token, Unauthorized]
```

```
2020-07-26T03:13:42.007781716Z I0726 03:13:42.007738       1 etcdcli.go:96] configmaps/etcd-endpoints is missing annotation alpha.installer.openshift.io/etcd-bootstrap
2020-07-26T03:13:45.015900115Z I0726 03:13:45.015856       1 etcdcli.go:96] configmaps/etcd-endpoints is missing annotation alpha.installer.openshift.io/etcd-bootstrap
```

```
`APIServerDeploymentDegraded: 1 of 3 requested instances are unavailable for apiserver.openshift-apiserver`
```

```
2020-07-25T20:16:52.651204404Z time="2020-07-25T20:16:52Z" level=error msg="failed to reconcile request /default: failed to ensure dns namespace: failed to ensure dns cluster role for openshift-dns: rpc error: code = Unavailable desc = transport is closing"
```

```
2020-07-26T03:51:06.95512586Z 2020/07/26 03:51:06 configmap 'openshift-config/initial-kube-apiserver-server-ca' name differs from trustedCA of proxy 'cluster' or trustedCA not set; reconciliation will be skipped
```

We're asking the following questions to evaluate whether or not this bug warrants blocking an upgrade edge from either the previous X.Y or X.Y.Z. The ultimate goal is to avoid delivering an update which introduces new risk or reduces cluster functionality in any way. Sample answers are provided to give more context and the UpgradeBlocker flag has been added to this bug. It will be removed if the assessment indicates that this should not block upgrade edges. The expectation is that the assignee answers these questions.

Who is impacted?  If we have to block upgrade edges based on this issue, which edges would need blocking?
  example: Customers upgrading from 4.y.Z to 4.y+1.z running on GCP with thousands of namespaces, approximately 5% of the subscribed fleet
  example: All customers upgrading from 4.y.z to 4.y+1.z fail approximately 10% of the time
What is the impact?  Is it serious enough to warrant blocking edges?
  example: Up to 2 minute disruption in edge routing
  example: Up to 90seconds of API downtime
  example: etcd loses quorum and you have to restore from backup
How involved is remediation (even moderately serious impacts might be acceptable if they are easy to mitigate)?
  example: Issue resolves itself after five minutes
  example: Admin uses oc to fix things
  example: Admin must SSH to hosts, restore from backups, or other non standard admin activities
Is this a regression (if all previous versions were also vulnerable, updating to the new, vulnerable version does not increase exposure)?
  example: No, it’s always been like this we just never noticed
  example: Yes, from 4.y.z to 4.y+1.z Or 4.y.z to 4.y.z+1

*** This bug has been marked as a duplicate of bug 1852047 ***

The needinfo request[s] on this closed bug have been removed as they have been unresolved for 1000 days