Bug 20453 - xinetd not work properly
Summary: xinetd not work properly
Alias: None
Product: Red Hat Linux
Classification: Retired
Component: xinetd   
(Show other bugs)
Version: 7.0
Hardware: i386 Linux
Target Milestone: ---
Assignee: Trond Eivind Glomsrxd
QA Contact: David Lawrence
Depends On:
TreeView+ depends on / blocked
Reported: 2000-11-07 02:53 UTC by Łukasz Trąbiński
Modified: 2007-04-18 16:29 UTC (History)
2 users (show)

Fixed In Version:
Doc Type: Bug Fix
Doc Text:
Story Points: ---
Clone Of:
Last Closed: 2000-11-15 18:37:07 UTC
Type: ---
Regression: ---
Mount Type: ---
Documentation: ---
Verified Versions:
Category: ---
oVirt Team: ---
RHEL 7.3 requirements from Atomic Host:
Cloudforms Team: ---

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Description Łukasz Trąbiński 2000-11-07 02:53:42 UTC
On system with many accounts (over 5000) and many connections xinetd
dosen't work
After few minutes
[root@xxx ]# telnet xxx
Trying xxx.xxx.xxx.xx...
Connected to xxx.xxx.edu.pl.
Escape character is '^]'.

and still trying...

DNS & revDNS are OK, kernel 2.2.17 with ipv6

Comment 1 Trond Eivind Glomsrxd 2000-11-07 15:24:20 UTC
We don't compile in support IPv6 in xinetd...

Anyway, can you take a look at the "-loop" argument and see if increasing that

How many connects/second do you have? Is it just one service, or all services?

Comment 2 Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak 2000-11-10 14:58:39 UTC
I have the similar problem. It seems that xinetd calls hosts_access()
function (TCP wrapper) from the main process instead of child processes.
Thus any DNS or ident timeout of _one_ client can make the whole xinetd
inoperable for few seconds or even minutes.

This occurs on my newly-upgraded RH7.0 system, which runs FTP server
and Qmail-based listserver (both started from xinetd). This is with
about 10000 FTP connection and 2000 SMTP ones per day. Migrating back
to inetd (RPM from RH6.2) solved the problem.

Comment 3 Łukasz Trąbiński 2000-11-14 09:24:05 UTC
I have tried with -loop 50 and - loop 100  option and xinetd still had a
problems with opening a new connection. I will try to use a newest version of

Comment 4 Łukasz Trąbiński 2000-11-15 17:04:45 UTC
After removed lines from /etc/hosts.allow
in.telnetd: ALL: RFC931: ALLOW
in.fingerd: ALL: RFC931: ALLOW
in.ftpd: ALL: RFC931: ALLOW
ipop3d: ALL: RFC931: ALLOW

xinetd works properly! Anyway, I'm sorry for this mistake.

Comment 5 Trond Eivind Glomsrxd 2000-11-15 17:23:11 UTC
To improve performance, use the internal access control (only_from etc) instead
of tcp_wrapper

Comment 6 Rob Braun 2000-11-15 17:59:20 UTC
The things you can do to improve performance on xinetd are:
1) don't do ident lookups.  This includes doing the ident
lookup in hosts.{allow,deny}.  Using USERID in xinetd is much 
better than doing it in hosts.{allow,deny}, because the lookup
is done in the child for a successful connection.  For a failed
connection, the ident lookup is done in the parent (painful).
2) Don't use hostnames in access control.  This requires
DNS lookups.  If you must use hostnames in access control, at
least run a name server locally, and leave out the "nameserver"
tag in resolv.conf.  This forces the resolver to use a local socket,
rather than using an AF_INET socket to the localhost.  Faster.
3) Avoid using hosts.{allow,deny}.  Move these files aside,
not just empty.  Use xinetd's internal access control.
4) You can up some of the numbers in xinetd/defs.h and you may
have improved performance.  This is of marginal benefit compared
to the improvements listed above.

I am also looking at separating the "heavy-weight" access
control from the "light-weight" access control.  This way,
hopefully I can get the "light-weight" stuff in the parent,
and the "heavy-weight" access control can go into the 
child.  This adds significant complexity, but should increase
performance under heavy load.

Comment 7 Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak 2000-11-15 18:08:37 UTC
: For a failed
; connection, the ident lookup is done in the parent (painful).
: 2) Don't use hostnames in access control.  This requires
: DNS lookups.

I consider this a bug in xidentd, not a feature. The
access control should be done in the child instead of
the parent process even when using hosts_access().
I think we all prefer the centralized and general access
control system of tcp wrappers instead of a non-universal
solution of a particular daemon.

Comment 8 Rob Braun 2000-11-15 18:19:54 UTC
This is really a philosophical difference.
On the one hand, there is the hardline approach of saying
we will not give any resources to an unknown entity
until we have verified it's authenticity to the best of
our ability.  Allowing the remote host to consume a process,
do a fork, and take up an extra 200K of memory before 
verifying that the remote host meets our access control
criteria, is a bug.  If the host performing the access
control cannot keep up, it is safer to prevent incoming
connections than to blindly allow them to consume resources.

On the other hand, it seems wrong that the access control
should force everything to fall behind and deny connections.
First and foremost comes the availability of the service,
and you're willing to give up some system resources to
ensure availability of that service.

From the first point of view, xinetd's handling of the
situation is not a bug, it is behaving correctly and
securely.  From the second point of view, xinetd is 
large, slow, inefficient, and it's handling of the
situation is a bug.

As I said in my previous explaination, I am looking into
a compromise, where the parent can do the easier tasks of
checking the time, how many instances of the service are
running, etc. while handing off the host_access() call
and the address matching (which includes name lookups)
to the child process.  This has some tradeoffs that are not
philosophical in nature, such as increasing the complexity
of the already complicated access control system.


Comment 9 Jan "Yenya" Kasprzak 2000-11-15 18:37:05 UTC
What about the following approach:
- xinetd would be able to create some number (let's say 10,
	it can be configurable) of children on accept uncoditionally.
- child will then verify the access control using TCP wrapper's hosts_access().
- when the verification is done (successfuly or not), the child would
	notify the parent that it is either exiting or exec()ing the
	real daemon.

Then you will have at most 10 processes doing access control verification
at any time, and the master will not block. The notification mechanism
can be anything from realtime signals to SysV semaphores or FC_CLOEXEC'd
pipe from parent to the child.

Let's move this discussion to the private mail, it probably does not have
relevance to RH bugzilla.

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