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- crypto/rand

	- PRIMARY_RESEED_* vs SECONDARY_RESEED_* and RAND_get0_public / RAND_get0_private: It looks like that there are 2 DRBGs chained. Although this currently is of no concern, please note that the SP800-90C draft does not allow it. We are working with NIST to allow chained DRBGs though. Yet, please keep a close eye on how things are developing and have plans ready in case chaining is not allowed with the final 90C.

- providers/implementation/drbg

	- ossl_crngt_get_entropy: the yet draft SP800-90C requires requested entropy + 128 bits during initial seeding

	- ossl_rand_get_entropy: It looks like OpenSSL still implements an internal entropy pool of some size that is hashed to get seed data. Note that this is a conditioning step for which SP800-90C requires 64 additional bits from the entropy source to claim the requested amount of entropy.
Dima: Doesn’t look so for me: in this case we have a temporary object using secure memory to return buffer.

RHEL 9.1 contains openssl-3.0.1-43.el9_0.