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Description of problem:
Use target process context to set socket context when using SELinuxContextFromNet not systemds context. Currently when using the SELimuxContextFromNet option for a socket activated services systemd calls getcon_raw which returns init_t and uses the resulting context to compute the context to be passed to the setsockcreatecon call. A socket of type init_t is created and listened on and this means that SELinux policy cannot be written to control which processes (SELinux types) can connect to the socket since the ref policy allows all 'types' to connect to sockets of the type init_t. When security accessors see that any process can connect to a socket this raises serious concerns. I have spoken with SELinux contributors in person and on the mailing list and the consensus is that the best solution is to use the target executables context when computing the sockets context in all cases.
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I create a PR that has been merged upstream and I'd like to see that in the systemd package as soon as possible. Here's a link to the PR:
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/24994
I'm not sure if this is the correct way to get upstream changes into RHEL packages so tell me if there's a better way.
Also if this could be back ported to RHEL 8 that would be great.